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SHOULD MARRIAGE MATTER?: EVALUATING THE
RIGHTS OF LEGAL ABSENTEE FATHERS
Jennifer E. Burns"
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring.'
INTRODUCTION
Hardaway and Tammy, future father and mother, married in 1981.2
Over the next three years, they had a daughter and a son, Davn and
Daniel.' In 1989, Tammy left with the children and thereafter kept
them from Hardaway.4 Two years later, she left the children alone at
home and a fire erupted in the apartment.' Although the children
survived the fire, the child protection agency immediately removed
them from their mother's care, believing them to be in imminent
danger.6 The agency did not notify Hardaway that his children had
been taken into protective custody and would be placed in foster care,
nor that Tammy had been charged with abuse and neglect!
Hardaway was a registered driver in New York State and had a listed
telephone number by which the agency could have located him.s
Dawn and Daniel lived in foster care for the next four years.' While
in foster care, the children stated that Tammy had previously abused
them sexually." The foster father also allegedly physically abused
Daniel." Hardaway tried to locate his children numerous times
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Ann Moynihan for her invaluable insight, guidance, and support in
writing this Note. This Note is dedicated to my Mom in gratitude for her constant
inspiration, support, and patience.
1. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2- See Complaint at 9, para. 25, Daniel H. v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. filed
Mar. 5, 1996) (No. 96 Civ. 1605).
3. See id. at 9-10, paras. 26-27.
4. See id at 10, para. 28.
5. See id. para. 32.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 11, paras. 33-34.
8. See id. at 10, para. 30.
9. See id. para. 32; id at 14, para. 48.
10. See id. at 11, para. 36.
11. See id. at 14, para. 49.
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during this period, and even hired a private investigator." In July
1994, three years after the removal, the agency first notified him that
his children had been placed in foster care.1 3 Once he learned of their
whereabouts, he began visiting Daniel and Dawn, planning for their
return to his custody.1 4 In February 1995, Social Services returned
Daniel to his father's care. 5
This story illustrates the problems facing children, parents, and
foster care agencies when the custodial parent is charged with abuse
or neglect 6 and the other parent is absent. In emergency proceedings
to remove children from unsafe homes, 7 there is little time to find and
notify other family members before a child is placed in foster care
because of the urgent need to remove the child from the dangerous
situation. For example, a father who does not live with the child and
is not active in his child's life may not be found in time to prevent his
child's placement in foster care. Once the child has been removed
without notification to the absent parent, the issue then becomes
whether, and when, the non-custodial father s should receive
notification of a hearing on the child's permanent placement, and
what effort should be required to ensure that he receives such
notification.
Several recent cases filed in the Southern District of New York
challenge the procedures for notifying fathers under New York State
law in scenarios like that described above.' 9 Under the current law,
when a child is removed from a parent because of abuse or neglect, his
12. See id. at 10, para. 29.
13. See id. at 13, para. 42.
14. See id. at 14, para. 47.
15. See id. para. 48.
16. In 1997, 75% of all child abuse perpetrators were parents. See National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child
Maltreatment 1997: Reports from the States to the National Center on Child Abuse
and Neglect 7-1 (1999) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment 1997].
17. Emergency circumstances have been defined as those in which the child is
"immediately threatened with harm, for example, where there exists an 'immediate
threat to the safety of the child' ... or where there is evidence of serious ongoing
abuse and the officials have reason to fear imminent recurrence." Hurlman v. Rice,
927 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Sims v. State Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1977)). The child need not be harmed in
the presence of officials, see Chayo v. Kaladjian, 844 F. Supp. 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), nor does the alleged abuser need to be present when the child is taken, see
Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1987).
18. While there may be situations in which the child is removed from the custodial
father and the mother's notice rights are at issue, this Note focuses on fathers both
because of the comparative frequency of their claims as opposed to absentee mothers'
claims, and the constitutional analysis that is particular to the rights of fathers.
19. See Complaint, Jason Rudy C. v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 9,
1998) (No. 98 Civ. 0130); Daniel H. v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 5, 1996)
(No. 96 Civ. 1605). The challenged statutes include sections 1035 and 1036 of the
New York Family Court Act, and sections 384-b, 409-e, and 398-b(1)(c) of the New
York Social Services Law. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 1035, 1036 (McKinney 1999):
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 384-b, 398-b(1)(c), 409-e (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999).
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or her relatives must be located and informed of the removal
proceedings.2 The method by which these relatives are to be located,
or whether the other parent should be sought as a first priority, is
unclear from the statutory language.-1 Essentially, the above father-
litigants argue for aggressive, continuous notification throughout the
foster care proceedings.2- At the center of these disputes lies the
tension between a father's right and desire to care for his child, and
the state's interest in promptly securing the child's safety and stability
in a permanent placement."
These claims also raise the broader question of the scope of the
constitutionally protected rights of a legal father who has long been
absent from his child's life. Although marrying the mother generally
confers full parental rights on the natural father, other factors can lead
to the establishment of paternal rights,2 4 including establishing
biological paternity, acting as a father, and adopting the child. 5 The
term "legal father" refers to those men married to the mother at the
time of the child's birth who are aware of the child's existence. Status
as a legal father continues despite any deterioration in the relationship
between husband and wife. Legal absentee fathers pose a
complicated dilemma in that the fathers, while once married to the
mothers and legally established as parents, have not been involved in
their children's lives and now seek to influence their future.
Constitutional analysis of paternal rights26 has focused largely on
the rights of unwed fathers.27 At common law, if the parents were not
married, there was no legal relationship between the father and his
20. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1017 (McKinney 1999).
21. See id. (requiring only that "an immediate investigation" to locate relatives be
undertaken).
22- See Daniel H., No. 96 Civ. 1605, at 2. para. 2.
23. The State's authority to intervene in a family comes from two sources. See
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and tire Family, 93 Harv. L Rev. 1156,
1198 (1980). First, the State's police power allows it to prevent its citizens from
harming one another and to promote the public welfare. See id. at 1198-99. Second,
the State has the paternalistic power to protect those who cannot protect themselves.
See id. at 1199.
24. See Rebeca Aizpuru, Note, Protecting tie Unwed Father's Opportunity to
Parent A Survey of Paternity Registry Statutes, 18 Rev. Litig. 703, 715 (1999)
(including, for example, the appearance of the father's name on the child's birth
certificate).
25. See Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996
Utah L. Rev. 461,463.
26. Parental rights include the right to custody, the right to raise one's child, and
the right to make decisions about children's lives. See, e.g., 4 California Family Law §
60.02(1)(b) (C. Markey ed., 1987) (noting that custody -embrace[s] the sum of
parental rights," including the right to direct the child's activities, make decisions
regarding her health and education, and tend to her moral and religious education).
27. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. 658 (1972) (striking down a state
statute that granted hearings on parental fitness only to married parents, divorced
parents, and unmarried mothers, but denying a similar hearing to unwed fathers).
20001 2301
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child.' Due to the stigma attached to illegitimate children, the law
failed to protect them.29 Constitutional analysis of the rights of unwed
fathers traditionally focused on the nature of the interpersonal
relationship between father and child in determining the father's
rights.3" Thus, biological status3 alone does not define a paternal
relationship, but it can be enough to warrant constitutional protection
in the right circumstances.32 Implicit in this reasoning is the notion
that married fathers need not prove themselves as fathers to be
accorded full rights.33 Through marriage to the mother, fathers
receive full legal rights regardless of whether they fulfill their paternal
duties.
The rights of married fathers in the constitutional spectrum would
thus seem stronger than those of unwed fathers based on social
presumptions favoring natural legal families.34 The rights of married,
biological fathers have not been addressed by the courts except to the
limited extent as superseding those of an unwed father's claim to
28. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 704; see also Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers'
Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of
Patriarchy, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 67 (1995) (noting that the common law was
"profoundly patriarchal" and absolved an unwed father of all custodial
responsibilities).
29. See Tracy Cashman, Comment, When is a Biological Father Really a Dad?, 24
Pepp. L. Rev. 959, 962 (1997) (citing Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families
and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 Tul. L. Rev. 585,588 (1991)).
30. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (stating that the
Constitution does not compel protecting the opportunity for a relationship a
biological father possesses if he fails to "grasp[] that opportunity and accept[] some
measure of responsibility for the child's future").
31. Status as a parent is:
grounded in inexorable truths (e.g., the truths of biological process). Within
a universe of status, the obligations and rights that define relationships flow
automatically and inevitably from the fact of the relationship. Thus, for
instance, parents are expected to love and provide for their children, not
because they have agreed to do so, but simply because they are parents.
Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition from: Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond,
82 Geo. L.J. 1519, 1526 (1994). As such, status may "sanction[] significant
inequalities" among the members of a family and between family members and third
parties. but it can also "provid[e] for enduring relationships." Id. at 1571.
32. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Stanley v. Illinois as a circumstance in which "the actual
relationship between father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father
parental interests comparable to those of the married father.").
33. See id. ("The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other
measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial
relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother. By definition, the
issue [of the scope of a father's rights] can arise [before the Court] only when no such
marriage has taken place.").
34. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (striking down statute that
favored legal parents wholesale over unwed fathers); see also infra notes 277-85, 291-
94 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions in Quilloin v. Walcott and
Michael H. v. Gerald D.).
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parental rights in his child .3  An independent constitutional analysis
of the married father's right is the focus of this Note. While the
relationship between the married father and his child is biological and
could be viewed in the same manner as the relationship between an
unwed biological father and his child, it has the presumed additional
significance of legal and social legitimization as a relationship worth
protecting. Nonetheless, these factors should not enhance the
relationship's constitutional protection if such fathers do not actively
fulfill their paternal roles. In addition, demographic and cultural
changes have reduced the importance of marriage as the sole criterion
for determining paternal rights and duties.-
The analysis of a father's rights and responsibilities, and the bias
toward legally established relationships, becomes important in foster
care placement decisions. For example, when a child has been taken
by the state from one parent because of abuse or neglect, and the
other parent, though legally entitled to fully share in the child's
custody and care, has been absent, the court must decide whether to
simply reaffirm the established bias favoring the legal parent and
place the child with that parent, or to delay placement to consider
what alternative care arrangement might truly be in the child's best
interest. The best-interests-of-the-child standard has long dominated
childcare and custody analyses, and should be extended to trump an
absentee father's parental rights instead of favoring expeditious
placement.
Recent federal legislation pertaining to child abuse, placement, and
custody,37 urges prompt placement of children in a safe and loving
home without delay, in addition to seeking a solution to the family's
troubled situation that comports with the child's best interest.
Protecting the rights claimed by absentee fathers who have long let
them lie dormant would cause such an undesirable delay.- This delay
and its concomitant burdens on the system and the child are not
justified in light of the slim possibilities for successful care and
supervision in placing the child with a father who has long lapsed in
fulfilling his parental duties.
Typically, the most intense search for a father and effort to protect
his rights occurs when the state seeks to terminate his parental rights
35. See, eg., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (finding that where
a child born of an extramarital affair is born into an existing marital family, the
"natural father's unique opportunity [interest in developing a relationship with the
child] conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity [interest] of the husband of the
marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to
the latter").
36. See Harris, supra note 25, at 465. The emphasis has shifted toward basing
rights and duties on biological relationship. See infra Part II.B.1.
37. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
38. See infra Part III.
2000] 2_303
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in order to free his child for adoption. At this stage, the child has
languished in uncertainty for months, and the additional upheaval of a
father being found when the child nears stability through adoption can
be quite damaging. However, increasing the notification efforts
expended in the early stages, by intensifying efforts to find parents
and other family members in the fact-finding and case assessment
phases of state placement, may ease the potential delay without
adding procedural layers. Discovering the quality and existence of the
father-child relationship should be part of that initial effort. The
agency and court would thus avoid wasting valuable time that the
child may spend in foster care, and provide the absentee father with
notice at the earliest opportunity.
This Note provides a framework within which courts can analyze
claims by absentee legal fathers that they should have received
continuous notice of foster care proceedings. This Note's analysis
focuses on the child protection system and laws of New York State,
while highlighting similarities with, and differences from, other states.
Part I outlines the child protection and custody system in New York,
focusing on situations in which a child is taken from his parent based
on a suspicion of abuse or neglect.3 9 It then places child protection
issues within a political and social context. This part also describes the
statutory framework, primarily at the federal level, governing child
protection and placement services. Part II analyzes the application of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to family law
proceedings. This part details the Supreme Court cases addressing the
family interest protected by the Constitution, and discusses the
relative rights of the different parties in foster care proceedings.
Part III argues that based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the protected family interest, there is no constitutional requirement to
take extensive steps to facilitate an absentee legal father's opportunity
to develop a relationship with his child. This part further argues that
both policy and common sense weigh against granting a legal father,
who has sacrificed his right to be a parent, continual notice and
opportunity to be heard in state matters affecting his child. Finally, it
argues that statutory goals and provisions that shorten the period in
which a father can assert his right before permanency planning °
begins indicate a strong preference for prompt resolution over delay.
Aggressive case assessment and resource searching at the child's entry
into the state system strike the proper balance between the state's and
39. Children can also be placed in the foster system voluntarily by their parent or
parents. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
40. Through permanency planning, the child welfare system aims to find safe,
stable homes for children in which they can be placed for an extended period of time.
See Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 2285,2289 n.39 (1998).
2304 [Vol. 68
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the father's interests. If the father proves unavailable or uninterested
at that stage, then the court and protection agencies can move forward
with case planning. The continued search for absentee legal fathers
throughout a child's involvement in the state system would entail
unwarranted delay, which recent legislation aims to prevent. This
Note concludes that while the right to raise one's child is fundamental,
it is not absolute, and cannot be revived by the courts and child
protection system when a father has deliberately allowed it to lapse.
To do so would be contrary to the best interests of the child.
Consequently, legal fathers should be evaluated according to the same
standards as unwed fathers. Their actions and commitment should be
analyzed when determining their rights, rather than ending the inquiry
when a document proves their status. Parental rights should be
predicated on the fulfillment of parental duties." In this way, only
those fathers who fulfill their parental duties would be awarded the
associated rights of parenthood.42
I. THE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM
This part reviews the procedures typically governing a child's
removal from an abusive home and the subsequent steps taken to
notify the parties of state action regarding the child. It also highlights
criticisms of the foster care system, and looks at how placement
decisions affect the developmental needs of children. Finally, it
outlines the federal laws enacted to create standards and uniformity
among the states in child protection and custody cases.
A. Child Protection Proceedings
State intervention in domestic relations has traditionally been an
"unhappy but necessary feature of life" in American society4 3 State
agencies enforce child protection and placement laws in order to assist
abused and neglected children, and to identify ways to assist the entire
family in coping with the effects of poor parenting. Child protection
agencies struggle to make equitable and safe determinations regarding
childcare and custody that fairly affect the rights of all parties
involved. The process can be upsetting and challenging for the
children and their families, as well as the professionals assigned to
their cases.' 4
Child protection falls within the purview of state government, even
41. See Harris, supra note 25, at 480.
42. See id. (discussing the relationship between the duties and rights of both
fathers and mothers).
43. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 771 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. See Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson, Critical Issues in Permanency Planning:
An Overview, in Children Can't Wait: Reducing Delays for Children in Foster Care 9
(Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson eds., 1993).
2000] 2305
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though it is an area of the law that receives significant federal
funding.45 In many states, child protection is carried out by local
government agencies,46 frequently known as Child Protection Services
("CPS").47 A child may be voluntarily placed by a parent into the
state system, or he may be taken from a parent's care based on a
suspicion of abuse or neglect. Once he enters the system, he is subject
to the family court's decisions as to where and with whom he will live.
Child protection agencies work with many parties, including judges,
lawyers, and foster parents, to formulate case planning.48 The overlap
among these parties should provide "safeguards for families, a range
of expertise, and a sense of urgency to determine the plan."49 This
overlap, however, can also lead to delay, frustration, and mixed
messages." All of these professionals work under immense pressure
and time constraints. Consequently, cases often do not receive the
degree of attention that they merit. 1 Additionally, many child welfare
agencies suffer high turnover due to reassignment, burnout, and low
wages. 2 As a result, many children have multiple caseworkers with
varying levels of experience handling their cases. 3
These overburdened agencies must balance two essential values of
American society: the protection of children and the respect for family
privacy. 4 State child protection generates controversy because it pits
society's need to protect children from harm against a parent's right to
raise them." Consequently, state child protection agencies are often
45. See Mary B. Lamer et al., Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect:
Analysis and Recommendations, The Future of the Children, Spring 1998, at 4, 4. This
funding relationship becomes particularly important when federal law makes
significant policy shifts with which the states must comply. See infra Part I.C.1.
46. See Lamer, supra note 45, at 5.
47. The generic name of Child Protective Services will be used throughout this
Note for consistency. Agencies can take various names for providing the same
services; for example, the Administration for Children's Services governs state
childcare proceedings in New York City.
48. See Cahn & Johnson, supra note 44, at 1-2.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 6.
52. See id. at 7.
53. See id.
54. See Lamer, supra note 45, at 5. When handling child abuse and neglect cases.
"the Constitution already requires courts to balance carefully the need to protect
children with the strong obligation to protect family autonomy." Carolyn Wilkes
Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting it Back Together Again: Refining the
Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 1045, 1087 (1996). A tension also exists between the fear of "violat[ing] a
family's integrity before intervention is justified and the fear of ... [waiting] until it
may be too late to protect the child whose well-being is threatened." Joseph
Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child 133 (1979).
55. See Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective
Services, The Future of Children, Spring 1998, at 23,24; see also Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families for Equality and Reform ("OFFER"), 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1977)
("Foster care of children is a sensitive and emotion-laden subject, and foster-care
2306 [Vol. 68
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accused of both unnecessary interference with private life and
"irresponsible inaction" when children are in real danger.5'
As to the first criticism, the legal system generally allows parents to
raise their children according to their own value system.
Consequently, courts require proof of danger or harm to the child
before allowing the state to intervene in the family relationshipY
Regarding the second criticism, the court is responsible for
determining "when a family's situation has so deteriorated that the
children's welfare and development are at risk to such a degree that
state intervention is justifiable."' The seriousness of a miscalculation
is great: overestimating the degree of danger could needlessly shatter
a family and rupture the child's closest relationships; underestimating
the danger could mean suffering or death.59 With these burdens, CPS
and the courts try to make proper judgments, but are not infallible.
The balance between the courts and CPS aims to foreclose the
possibility of damaging, if not fatal, inaction.
A detailed description of foster care proceedings follows. This
explanation borrows heavily from the New York system, which has
been looked to as a model for other states,' and hence has broad
applicability in analyzing state childcare across the country.6t
A child may enter the foster care system in New York in several
ways. For example, the state may take the child either through court
intervention62 or voluntary commitment. 63 Once a determination to
programs consequently stir strong controversy.").
56. See Lamer, supra note 45, at 5; Michael W. Weber, The Assessment of Child
Abuse: A Primary Function of Child Protective Services, in The Battered Child 120,
120-21 (Mary Edna Heifer et al. eds., 5th ed. 1997).
57. See Schene, supra note 55, at 23; see also Paul D. Steinhauer, The Least
Detrimental Alternative: A Systematic Guide to Case Planning and Decision Making
for Children in Care 202 (1991) (discussing the dilemma of the family court in
balancing the intrusion into family life against the potential for future harm).
58. Steinhauer, supra note 57, at 202.
59. See generally id. (noting the risks to children who are left in deteriorating
family situations); Lamer, supra note 45, at 5 (same).
60. Family Court Judge Susan R. Larabee has stated that "New York state's
statute has been a model for other states and other countries." Susan R. Larabee,
Representing the Government in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceeding, in Child Abuse
and Neglect: Protecting the Child, Defending the Parent, Representing the State, at
59, 69 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. C4-4183, 1988),
available in WESTLAW, 148 PLI/Crim. 59.
61. See Bailie, supra note 40, at 2298.
62. For example, where both natural parents have died and there are no relatives
willing to assume custody or guardians appointed custody, an appropriate government
agency takes the child into custody. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(4)(a) (McKinney
1992); id. § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 1999) (parents' abandonment).
63. A voluntary commitment occurs when a parent or guardian signs a written
instrument entrusting the care of the child to an authorized agency. See N.Y. Fam. Ct.
Act § 1021 (McKinney 1999). Parents may voluntarily commit custody of their child
to the state for a number of reasons. They may be experiencing problems related to
drug or alcohol addiction, financial difficulties, psychological problems, or other
physical ailments. See Joseph R. Carrieri, Child Custody, Foster Care, and Adoptions
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
intervene is made, the state takes temporary physical custody of the
child and places him in a foster family atmosphere with a view toward
permanency planning.'M  Permanency planning involves either
returning the child to the biological parent or releasing the child for
adoption 5 where return to the biological parent is not appropriate.66
Court intervention, as opposed to voluntary commitment, begins
with a report of abuse or neglect.67 Reports of abuse can come from
several sources. Professionals in all states must report suspected
abuse,'M while laypersons 69 are required to report in some states and
may voluntarily report in others.70 Both groups can make their report
anonymously to a CPS hotline.7 Based on such a report, an agency or
law enforcement official can remove a child without prior court
approval if that person has reasonable cause to believe the child is in
16 (1991) [hereinafter Carrieri, Child Custody]. The terms, duration, and conditions
of the agreement may be determined and agreed to by the parties. See id.
64. See Joseph R. Carrieri, Social Worker's Legal Handbook, in Child Abuse.
Neglect and the Foster Care System 1998: Effective Social Work and the Legal
System; The Attorney's Role and Responsibilities 7, 78-79 (1998) [hereinafter
Carrieri, Handbook].
65. Adoption is a legal proceeding in which an adult "acquires the rights and
incurs the responsibilities of a parent" toward a minor child. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 110 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
66. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 78.
67. See Schene, supra note 55, at 31 fig.1. A child is found to be abused when the
child's parent "inflicts, or allows to be inflicted, physical injury, or commits, or allows
to be committed, a sex offense against the child." Carrieri, Child Custody, supra note
63, at 17. A court typically finds a child to be neglected if the child's parent "has
failed to exercise a minimum degree of care." Id. at 17-18; see also N.Y. Soc. Serv.
Law §§ 371(4-a)(i)(A)-(B), 412 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. §
1012 (McKinney 1999). In 1994, nearly 3 million reports of child maltreatment were
made nationwide. See National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment 1994: Reports from the States to
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect 2-1 (1996). That number remained
the same in 1995. See National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment 1995: Reports from the States to
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect 2-1 (1997).
68. For example, New York State's affirmative duty applies to, among others.
health care workers, social workers, law enforcement officers, judicial officers,
dentists, psychologists, day care workers, and education employees. See N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1999). These individuals must report whenever
they have "reasonable cause to suspect" that a child has been maltreated. Id.
69. In New York State, any individual can make a report to the abuse hotline,
even if he does not have a statutory affirmative duty to do so. See Valmonte v. Bane,
18 F.3d 992, 995 (2d Cir. 1994).
70. See Larner, supra note 45, at 6.
71. See id. For example, in 1995, more than half of the reports in the United
States came from professionals, such as teachers (15%), law enforcement personnel
(13%), doctors (11%), and others. See id. One-fifth (19%) came from family
members of the victims, and the remainder were from friends and neighbors (9%),
other reporters (7%), and anonymous individuals (12%). See id. New York State
maintains a telephone hotline with a toll-free number that is staffed full-time to
receive complaints about abuse or neglect. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 422(2)(a)
(McKinney 1992); Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 995.
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imminent danger if she remains in the home. - If removed, the child is
placed in out-of-home care with the family court's approval. 3
After receiving a report of abuse, CPS conducts a screening to
determine the needed follow-up measures.74 During this screening, a
CPS staff member evaluates the strength of the allegations, the
potential danger of the alleged perpetrator, and the state of the
children living in the home, including any children who were not
specifically alleged to be abused.75 The CPS official makes these
initial determinations within twenty-four to seventy-two hours." If
the report is unsubstantiated and the alleged mistreatment appears to
be unfounded, the case is closed.' If the allegations prove credible, a
worker investigates to assess whether continued CPS involvement is
necessary. 8
72. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-401(l)(a) (1997), D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2309(a)(3)
(Michie 1997 & Lexis Supp. 2000); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1024(a) (McKinney 1999);
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-610(A)(1) (Lawyers Co-op. 1985). An emergency situation
exists when an authorized person:
(i)... has reasonable cause to believe that the child is in such circumstance
or condition that his continuing in said place of residence or in the care and
custody of the parent... presents an imminent danger to the child's life or
health; and
(ii) there is not enough time to apply for an order under section one
thousandtwenty-two [of the Family Court Act].
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 1024(a)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1999).
73. See Schene, supra note 55, at 31 fig.1.
74. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424 (McKinney 1992): Schene, supra note 55. at 30-
32.
75. See Schene, supra note 55, at 30.
76. See Lamer, supra note 45, at 7. New York Social Services Law provides that
the child protective service shall:
commence or cause the appropriate society for the prevention of cruelty to
children to commence, within twenty-four hours, an appropriate
investigation which shall include an evaluation of the environment of the
child named in the report and any other children in the same home and a
determination of the ... nature, extent and cause of any condition
enumerated in such report.., and, after seeing to the
safety of the child or children, forthwith notify the subjects of the report ...
of the existence of the report and their respective rights ....
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Lav § 424(6) (McKinney 1992); see also Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code §
328 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (providing that a probation officer shall immediately
commence an investigation to determine whether child welfare services should be
offered to the family or whether court proceedings should be commenced); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 19-3-312(1) (1999) (providing that the court must immediately investigate
reports of abuse to determine whether a child needs further protection and whether
to authorize the filing of a petition); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 4903(1) (1991) (providing
that the department of child welfare services shall "investigate all complaints of
neglect, abuse, or abandonment of children").
77. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424(7) (McKinney 1992): cf Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-
501(1)(a) (1999) (providing the option that no further action be taken).
78. See Schene, supra note 55, at 31 fig.1. In New York, the local DSS agency
must investigate the truth of alleged abuse charges and complete an investigation
within 60 days. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 423(1) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999); id. §
424(7) (McKinney 1992).
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The case can then proceed along three possible routes. First, CPS
may determine that the risk to the child has subsided and services are
unnecessary.79 Second, CPS may determine that services are required,
and other agencies will then provide such services to the family and
review the family's progress.80 These services may facilitate the
protection of the child or the rehabilitation of the family.8' If the risk
subsequently subsides, the case is closed; if it remains, services will
continue to be provided.' However, if the risk increases, the child is
removed from the home and placed in protective custody. 3
Three hearings take place once a child is deemed in danger and in
need of possible placement outside the home: a fact-finding hearing to
determine the existence of abuse or neglect, 84 a dispositional hearing, 5
and an extension-of-placement hearing. 6 The fact-finding hearing is
held before a family court judge and is similar to a trial.' If the court
finds that the facts in the petition alleging child abuse do not sustain
those allegations, the court must dismiss the petition.ss If there is a
finding of abuse or neglect, the court will hold a dispositional hearing
to decide what will happen to the child. 9 Holding the dispositional
79. See Schene, supra note 55, at 31 fig.l. "Services" provided to a family aim to
assist the family in remedying the difficult situation that led them to abuse the child.
See Bailie, supra note 40, at 2299.
80. See Schene, supra note 55, at 31.
81. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1015-a (McKinney 1999).
82. See id. These services are intended theoretically to be preventive and
protective measures aimed at helping to improve the family situation. See Bailie,
supra note 40, at 2299. Under federal law, such services include individual, group, and
family counseling; substance abuse treatment services; mental health services; and
assistance to address domestic violence. See 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7)(B)(i)-(iv) (Supp.
1999).
83. See Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 361(c) (West 1998); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-
2309 (1997); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. §§ 1021-29 (McKinney 1999); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-301 (Supp. 1996).
84. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1044 (McKinney 1999) (defining fact-finding as a
hearing to determine whether the child has been abused or neglected). In a petition
for the commitment of the guardianship and custody of a child, the law requires clear
and convincing evidence in support of the allegations. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §
614(1)(a)-(d), 622 (McKinney 1999).
85. A dispositional hearing is held to determine what action should be taken in
accordance with the best interests of the child. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 623
(McKinney 1999).
86. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 85-88.
87. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-505 (1999); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1044 (McKinney
1999); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.31 (West 1997); Carrieri, Child Custody, supra note 63, at
86.
88. See Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 356 (West 1984); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-
505(6); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1051(c) (McKinney 1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-
129(a)(1) (1996).
89. See Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 361.5(b)-(c) (West 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
19-3-507; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 1045 (McKinney 1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-129(c)
(1996); Carrieri, Child Custody, supra note 63, at 86-88.
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hearing is a prerequisite to continued placement of the child outside
the home.9
At the dispositional hearing, the court will frequently place the
child with a relative91 or in foster care for an initial period of up to one
year.2 Once the child is in foster care, the child welfare agency must
assess the original family's situation and develop a family service
plan.93 At this point, permanency planning begins with four possible
options: reunification with the family,' long-term foster care; legal
guardianship; or termination of parental rights to facilitate adoption."
Reunification will be sought when and if it is within the best interests
of and safe for the child.96
The most drastic of these options is the termination of parental
rights ("TPR"). Termination of parental rights is sought where
"positive, nurturing parent-child relationships no longer exist," and
the best interests of the child will be served by freeing her for
adoption.97 If the mother was married during the time the child was
conceived and born, the man to whom she was married must be made
a party to any termination proceedings.98 If an unwed father has
registered in the putative father registry, he is also entitled to notice.
Before a parent's rights can be terminated, the state must give notice
by personal service or by publication." When a child has been
removed from a mother's care and an absentee father exists, CPS may
file a petition to terminate the father's rights if it finds that, despite its
efforts to encourage and strengthen a parent's relationship with his
child, the father has nonetheless failed to improve the relationship.'
90. See Carrieri, Child Custody, supra note 63, at 88.
91. See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family
Care and Kinship Care, The Future of Children, Spring 1998, at 72, 72-73. Relatives
have no legal obligation to become a child's caregiver, but they often provide for their
abused or neglected family members. See id.
92. See Cal. Fam. Code § 7828(a)(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); N.Y. Fain. Ct.
Act. § 1055(b)(i) (McKinney 1999); Bailie, supra note 40, at 2301 & n.120. Under
New York law, foster care is defined as: "care provided a child in a foster family free
or boarding home, group home, agency boarding home, child care institution, health
care facility or any combination thereof .... N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 392(1)(a)
(McKinney 1992). The State licenses foster parents. This license indicates that "their
homes have been assessed for basic health and safety standards," and that they have
received at least minimal training on how "to provide care and supervision for a
child." Berrick, supra note 91, at 73.
93. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409-e(1)-(2) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999).
94. Reunification services vary among the states, but may include providing
parents with the skills and knowledge necessary for child-raising in contemporary life.
See Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
Versus Parents, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1209, 1239-40 (1994).
95. See Schene, supra note 55, at 31 fig.1.
96. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(1)(a)(ii)-(iii) (McKinney 1992).
97. See id. § 384-b(1)(b).
98. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 60-61.
99. See id. at 124-25.
100. See, eg., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 614(1)(d) (McKinney 1999) (stating that a TPR
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Once a court terminates parental rights, the child is committed to the
child welfare agency1"1 and is thereby freed for adoption.
Before terminating parental rights, a diligent search must be made
for the absentee parent if personal service cannot be rendered."~ A
diligent search may include: a visit to the last known address,
interviewing neighbors and acquaintances; interviewing all known
relatives in the area; scanning welfare, hospital, shelter, and drug
rehabilitation records; checking the post office for a forwarding
address; and searching the Board of Elections, Department of Motor
Vehicles, and the Department of Corrections. 3 Under New York's
statute, it remains unclear whether any of these methods must be
performed, or whether failure to pursue any or all of these avenues
would be dispositive of a failure to conduct a diligent search.'0 '
Abandonment serves as one ground for terminating parental
rights.' Abandonment may best describe the actions of the fathers
focused on in this Note. Abandonment is defined as an "intent to
forego [one's] parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or
her failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or
agency.... "106 Without evidence to the contrary, the ability to visit
and communicate is presumed) ° The intention not to abandon a
child is insufficient to defeat a finding of abandonment. 8 The mere
statement of an intention to care for a child, without any actions
manifesting that intention, is not sufficient to overcome a parent's
inaction. 9 The abandonment can be broken simply by a phone call
or visit within a stipulated time period."0 Under New York law, this
petition may be filed if the parent "has failed ... substantially and continuously or
repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child").
101. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 634.
102. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 391.
103. See id. at 391-93.
104. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 1055 (McKinney 1999) (specifying no
particular means by which the diligent search should be executed).
105. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1992). Other grounds for
termination include that the child is permanently neglected, that the parents severely
or repeatedly abused their child, and the child has been in state care for the year prior
to the proceeding. See id. §§ 384-b(4)(d)-(e).
106. Id. § 384-b(5)(a); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.032(14) (1997) ("'Abandoned'
means a situation in which the parent ... while being able, makes no provision for the
child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is
sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations.").
107. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(5)(a).
108. See id. § 384-b(5)(b) ("The subjective intent of the parent, whether expressed
or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of the foregoing parental acts manifesting such
intent, shall not preclude a determination that such a parent has abandoned his or her
child.").
109. See, e.g., In re Jennifer S., 333 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (finding a
mother's "naked statement" of desire to have her child with her insufficient where no
effort to contact the child had been made during the five years of her life); Carrieri,
Child Custody, supra note 63, at 180-81.
110. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 127.
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time period is the "six months immediately prior to the date on which
the [TPR] petition is filed.""' Consequently, some courts have held
that diligent efforts 12 by the agency to strengthen the parental
relationship are not required where the absentee parent has not made
any communication efforts over the previous six months.1 3
Nonetheless, the court must still inquire whether a good reason
exists for the absentee parent's failure to visit or communicate."' For
example, incarceration does not in itself excuse a father's failure to
maintain contact."5 There must be an additional showing that he was
prohibited from contacting the child or child welfare agency." 6
Similarly, distance will not serve as an excuse when it is self-
imposed. 7 To disprove the abandonment charge, the objecting
parent must show that the hardship asserted as an obstacle to visiting
or communicating with the child, at a minimum, "permeated" the
father's life to such an extent that contact with the child or agency was
not feasible."' Insubstantial contacts may not be sufficient." 9 One
communication with the child welfare agency during the relevant time
period,1 20 two insubstantial contacts with the child over a two-year
period,2  or sending birthday and holiday cards' "  do not
111. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1992); see also 750 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 50/1(D)(n) (West 1999) (failure to communicate for one year); Kan Stat.
Ann. § 59-2136(d) (1994) (father's consent to stepparent adoption is unnecessary if he
"has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years next
preceding the filing of the petition for adoption"); cf Cal. Fam. Code § 7822(a) (West
1994 & Supp. 2000) (presumption of abandonment where parent fails to communicate
for six months).
112. Diligent efforts are reasonable attempts by an agency to "assist, develop and
encourage a meaningful relationship between the parent and child...." N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 384-b(7)(f). Such efforts may include:
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parents in developing a plan for
appropriate services to the child and his family; (2) making suitable
arrangements for the parents to visit the child... ; (3) provision of services
and other assistance to the parents .. so that problems preventing the
discharge of the child from care may be resolved or ameliorated; [and] (4)
informing the parents at appropriate intervals of the child's progress,
development, and health ....
Id § 384-b(7)(f)(1)-(4).
113. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 379-81.
114. See id at 381.
115. See In re Gregory B., 542 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (N.Y. 1989).
116. See In re Jasmine T., 557 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670-71 (App. Div. 1990).
117. See In re Stephen B., 303 N.Y.S.2d 438, 442 (Fam. Ct. 1969); Carrieri, Child
Custody, supra note 63, at 182.
118. See In re Catholic Child Care Soe'y of the Diocese of Brooklyn, 492 N.Y.S.2d
831, 833 (App. Div. 1985); Carrieri, Child Custody, supra note 63, at 181.
119. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 384.
120. See, eg., In re Starr L.B., 497 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600-01 (Fam. C1. 1985) (finding
that a single phone call where the father was able to call daily did not break the
abandonment period).
121. See, &g., In re Michael David K., 433 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (App. Div. 1980)
(finding that such insubstantial contacts did not constitute a "modicum of interest").
122. See, e.g., In re Amanda, 602 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that
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automatically overcome the presumption of abandonment. Some
state statutes expressly provide that mere "token" contact with a child
will not prevent termination of parental rights.' 23 The father's actions
may be scrutinized during the pregnancy" or when the child is a
newborn' 1 to determine whether he has abandoned his child.
Abandonment determinations based on the actions taken during
pregnancy focus on the father's treatment of the mother, and are then
attributed to his potential relationship with the child.'26 Therefore,
the father's parental rights can be foreclosed before he has an
the mere sending of cards, when other communication was possible, was insufficient
to defeat a finding of abandonment).
123. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.032(14) (West Supp. 1997) ("marginal efforts" at
communication insufficient); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2136(d) (1994) ("In determining
whether a father's consent [to a stepparent adoption] is required under this
subsection, the court may disregard incidental visitations, contacts, communications
or contributions."); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 128.105(2)(f) (1998) ("token efforts"
insufficient); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(6) (Supp. 1996) (same); see also In re
Adoption of B.O., 927 P.2d 202, 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (affirming termination of
father's rights based on finding that he made only "token" contacts with daughter).
124. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d 680, 687-90 (Kan. Ct. App.
1994) (affirming the Kansas statute's provision premising termination of parental
rights on failure to support the child's mother during the six months prior to the
child's birth (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2136(h)(4) (1993)); accord In re Baby Boy G., No.
2970889, 1999 WL 64951, at *4 (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 12, 1999) (determining provision
of pre-birth support to the unborn child upon failure to perform parental duties); In re
Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1162 (D.C. 1990) (finding that when a court evaluates
a father's claimed assertion of his opportunity interest, the court may focus on the
extent of the father's involvement from the time that he learns of the pregnancy);
W.T.J. v. E.W.R., 721 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1998) (same); In re Adoption of Baby
E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 964 (Fla. 1995) (finding abandonment where father verbally
and emotionally abused the pregnant mother, failed to attend doctor's appointment,
forced her to move out of their apartment, and failed to provide her with any support
during the pregnancy); In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 640 A.2d 1085, 1097-98 (Md.
1994) (finding that a man who deserts the expectant mother shows a lack of concern
for the future well-being of the child); Whitney v. Pinney, 956 P.2d 785, 788 (Nev.
1998) (concluding that a court can properly look at a father's pre-birth actions as one
factor in its abandonment inquiry); Baby Girl K. ex rel. L.K. v. B.B., 335 N.W.2d 846,
852 (Wis. 1983) (determining that father's assault of pregnant mother, attempts to
convince expectant mother to smuggle marijuana, and failure to provide financial or
emotional support to the pregnant mother supported finding of abandonment). In
1994, the drafters of the Uniform Adoption Act proposed to codify this approach to
finding "abandonment." See Unif. Adoption Act § 3-504(c)(1) (1994). For an analysis
of the possible impact of such a change, see generally Gerald W. Huston, Note, Born
to Lose: The Illinois "Baby Richard" Case-How Examining His Father's Pre-Birth
Conduct Might Have Led to a Different Ending for Richard, 16 N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 543
(1996).
125. For example, Illinois provides that a parent may be found "unfit" if he fails "to
demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the
welfare of a new-born child during the first 30 days after its birth." 750 II1. Comp. Stat.
50/1(D)(1) (West 1996).
126. The Nevada Supreme Court recently affirmed a trial court's order terminating
the parental rights of an unwed father based upon the ground of "abandonment,"
where the father had provided no financial or emotional support to the mother during
her pregnancy and informed her that he would support her decision to surrender the
child for adoption. See Whitney v. Pinney, 956 P.2d 785, 787-89 (Nev. 1998).
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opportunity to be a parent by failing to show concern and care before
the child is born.
A finding of abandonment can be the first step in terminating a
father's rights to his child. By his inaction, the father has
demonstrated to the court that he is unwilling to assume the duties of
fatherhood. That inaction can be measured even before the child's
birth to predict how the father is likely to act in the future. Once his
rights are terminated, he has no legal standing to seek visitation or
custody rights with his child, who is legally freed for adoption.
B. Foster Care in Crisis
Despite its efforts to successfully care for children at risk, foster
care is often heavily criticized for its failures. Consequently, policy
concerns undeniably affect the decisions made by both legislatures
and courts on how best to address childcare and protection issues.
Commentators argue that placing children in temporary foster care,
no matter how nurturing the environment, is not in their best
interests.127 In addition, the media continually report horror stories of
children abused or killed while in foster care."2 Although foster care
aims to protect children from neglect and abuse by parents and other
family members, it often becomes an equally cruel form of neglect and
abuse at the hands of the state. 29 Child welfare agencies have also
been criticized for inadequately providing for children by focusing
only on meeting their basic physical needs. 3 Criticisms such as these
make expeditious resolution of a child's care and permanent
placement of utmost urgency.
Gathering statistics to discover the extent of re-abuse in foster care
has proven difficult."' Re-abuse refers to the abuse of children in
foster care by their caretakers after they have been removed from an
127. See Nancy Garland, Wanted: Parents, More Maine Children up for Adoption;
Media Step up Assistance to Agencies, Bangor Daily News, Nov. 6, 1999, at BI.
128. See, eg., Pamela Mercer, Toddlers Seriously Ill After Swallowing Pills: Two
Boys in Foster Care Got Hold of Medication Used for Hypertension and Hyperactivity,
Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 6, 1999, at 1 (reporting on two boys hospitalized after
consuming medication while 61-year-old foster mother slept).
129. See National Commission on Children, Beyond Rhetoric: A New American
Agenda for Children and Families 287-88 (1991) [hereinafter Beyond Rhetoric];
O'Brien, supra note 94, at 1242. In 1997, 41 states reported their fatality rates for
foster care: 23 states had no fatalities; 4 states suffered 1 fatality; 2 states reported 3
fatalities; and 2 other states had 2 fatalities. See Child Maltreatment 1997, supra note
16, at 6-1.
130. See, e.g., Roger Miller, State's Parenting Skills Taken to Task, Pantagraph, Oct.
28, 1999, at A4 ("The State... sometimes [was] a worse parent than the parent we
took the children from because in most cases those parents loved their children.").
131. In 1984, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect began to require
those states participating in its grant program to treat reports of abuse and neglect for
children in substitute care similar to all other reports, and not just as violations of
licensing standards. See James A. Rosenthal et al., A Descriptive Study of Abuse and
Neglect in Out-of-Home-Placement, 15 Child Abuse & Neglect 249, 250 (1991).
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abusive home.132 A recent study focusing on the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services charted the abuse and neglect of
children in substitute care from 1992 through 1997.133 Substitute care
includes care with relatives, family foster care, specialized foster care
for children with special physical and emotional problems, and
institutional care.M The study considered only those children whose
cases were open for at least seven days, 135 and found an average 2%
re-abuse report rate.136 The rate varied only 1% during the five-year
focus period despite a continual increase in the number of children in
the system.'37 While this percentage may seem low, any abuse is
troubling because the state is supposedly protecting these children
from abuse by removing them from their homes.
When examined by placement type, family foster care in the Illinois
study generally had the highest rate of re-abuse. 3  The five-year
average rate was 2.5%. 139 By comparison, the average rate for those
living in care with relatives was 1.9%, with a high of 2.6% in 1995.40
Adoptive placements, where the child lives while awaiting completion
of the legal adoption process, had an average re-abuse rate of 1.6%.14,
The permanency and familiarity of the placement, therefore, reduced
the risk of re-abuse.
The Illinois study also showed that younger children are more at
risk than their older counterparts in state-administered childcare
systems. In family foster care, for example, children are most
vulnerable to re-abuse between the ages of three and nine.'42 This
rate is double that of children living with relatives. 43 The type of
abuse most common to family foster care and kinship care is
substantial risk of physical harm,1" followed by sexual abuse. 45
Overcrowding in homes presents problems in providing quality
care. The number of children in the system continually increasesy4 6
132. See John Poertner et al., How Safe are Out-of-Home Placements?, 21 Children
& Youth Servs. Rev. 549, 549 (1999).
133. See id. at 551.
134. See id. at 554-55.
135. See id. at 552.
136. See id. at 553.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 555. Kinship care shared an equivalent rate in 1995 of 2.6% re-
abuse. See id.
139. See id. at 554.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 557.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 558. The risk of physical harm in kinship care was 54.3%, and in
foster care 52.1%. See id.
145. See id. The risk of sexual abuse in kinship care was 20.3%, and in foster care
36.9%. See id.
146. As recently reported, there are approximately 3000 children in foster care in
the District of Columbia. See Michael H. Cottman & Sari Horwitz, Williams to
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but the corresponding number of placements does not. 41 When
systems are overloaded, abuse worsens because agencies are forced to
overcrowd homes and lower standards of care. 4 ' Legislative
initiatives such as the Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"), 4 9
which grant exceptions to the requirement under the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("CWA")I'0 that reasonable
efforts be made to preserve the natural family,"' virtually guarantee
even larger increases in placement outside the home in the future.5'
This move away from parental placement favoritism leads to the
conclusion that more children will ultimately enter the state system.' 53
Concerns regarding foster care are not limited to physical
environment and well-being. Commentators have advised that when
children successfully bond with families, the state should make every
effort to protect and support their placements, wherever those
placements may be."5 Despite notions to the contrary, neither placing
a child for adoption nor returning her to her biological parents
guarantees permanence or stability.'55 To disrupt a favorable
placement unnecessarily, with the goal of providing permanence, is
"to remove children from families in which they are emotionally
bonded and doing well in the hope of finding a not-yet-available-but-
still-possibly-better alternative," and "tak[es] unnecessary chances
Appoint Official to Work Out Agencies' Problems, Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1999, at B7.
Maine has approximately 3000 children in its foster care system, 700 of whom are
available for adoption. See Garland, supra note 127. Since 1985, the foster care
population of the United States has nearly doubled. See Richard Wexler, Shattered
Families: Rise in Adoptions Comes at a Cost, Charleston Gazette, Nov. 2, 1999, at 5A.
In Lancaster County Pennsylvania, 570 children are in foster care and 2500 suffer
from abuse and neglect. See Ryan Robinson, Judge: "Family Issues are Dominating
Our Courts," Lancaster New Era, Oct. 25, 1999, at BI.
147. See Wexler, supra note 146 (noting that the anticipated increase in adoptions
has not occurred).
148. See id.
149. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 211 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
150. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-272, §
1, 94 Stat. 500 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994)).
151. See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 223,255 (1989-1990).
152 See Wexler, supra note 146.
153. See infra Part III.D.
154. See, e.g., David Herring, The Michigan Agency Attorney Project, in Cahn &
Johnson, supra note 44, at 29 (stating that the risk of substantial developmental harm
from an extended unstable placement was the motivation behind the reasonable
efforts requirement to prevent or shorten such placements).
155. See Steinhauer, supra note 57, at 222 (arguing that legal permanence is just
terminology and that permanence can only really be determined by the child's own
sense of the situation). "[R]emoving a child from a foster home that is experienced as
permanent by both the child and the foster parents in order to return her home or
place her on adoption elsewhere may do violence to that child's best chance for
permanence in a misguided attempt to secure it." Id.
20001 2317
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
with a child's adjustment and subsequent development."'56 Thus, state
agencies are sometimes criticized for doing exactly what they are
supposed to be doing-placing children in permanent safe homes.
The average child spends three years in out-of-home care before a
permanency decision is made.157  If a child languishes in
impermanence and instability too long, her ability to develop lasting
bonds with a caregiver is damaged. 158  The harm from extended
temporary foster care, without a sense of when and whether it will
become permanent, "may actually be worse for the child than the
abuse or neglect originally suffered in the parental home.' 159 Children
perceive time differently, and a period of even two years of instability
can be quite harmful.16° Therefore, the state should aim to make a
potentially permanent placement as early as possible in order to ease
the child's transition and help to establish a sense of stability.
While states have established intricate systems to address the needs
of damaged families, the performance of these systems has not been
flawless. In order to combat problems like those mentioned above
and establish uniform standards, Congress has enacted two major
pieces of family law legislation in recent decades. The next section
discusses that legislation and its impact on protection agencies.
C. Legislative History6'
Since 1935, Congress has legislated and provided funding to states
in the area of childcare and protection. While both federal and state
laws govern child protection procedures, federal laws establish the
general guidelines to which the states must adhere if they wish to seek
reimbursement for their social services expenses. These expenses
include the costs of foster care and other forms of substitute care, and
156. Id.
157. See Cahn & Johnson, supra note 44, at 1.
158. See id.
159. Herring, supra note 155, at 15.
160. See id.; see also N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(l)(b) (McKinney 1992)
("[Unnecessary stays [in foster care] may deprive these children of positive,
nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development into
responsible, productive citizens."). An additional problem results from separating a
child from his biological father. A large number of children in the United States do
not live with their biological fathers. See Joseph P. Shapiro, Honor Thy children, U.S.
News & World Report, Feb. 27, 1995, at 39 (reporting that 38% of all children do not
live with their biological fathers, an increase from 17.5% in 1960). Social literature
has highlighted the problems associated with the absence of a father figure in a child's
life. In fact, the absence of a father can be a better predictor than poverty of a child's
turn to crime or teenage pregnancy. See id. This problem is particularly acute in the
African American community. See John M. O'Donnell, Involvement of African
American Fathers in Kinship Foster Care Services, 44 Soc. Work 428, 429 (1999).
These problems of paternal separation may influence placement choices, as the father
is viewed as an important influence in the child's life.
161. See generally Schene, supra note 55 (documenting the legislative, social, and
political response to child maltreatment in the United States).
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related expenses for children including food and medical care. This
section discusses the two most recent and significant pieces of
legislation addressing foster care, child protection, and placement, and
compares their goals and successes.
1. Federal Child Protection Laws "
In the 1970s, the predominant approach to addressing child abuse
was to separate the parent and child."6 As a result, the foster care
system expanded to the point where more than 500,000 children were
living apart from their families in 1977.16 These children were often
simply shuffled around a system that was unable to properly handle its
overwhelming numbers." In response to the growing criticism of
state foster care systems, 166 Congress passed the CWA 67 The goal of
the CWA was to provide children with more permanent placements
than foster care was then providing,"a and to address deficiencies such
as states resorting too frequently to foster care and viewing the
placement of children in foster care as an end in itself."t The CWA
162. Federal laws enabling child protection services began in 1935 with the Child
Welfare Services Program. See Social Security Act, Title IV-B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-29
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). The statute provides grants to states to support preventive
and protective services to vulnerable children and their families. Beginning in 1961,
foster care payments were made under the Aid to Dependent Children program. See
Social Security Act, Title IV-A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (Supp. III 1997). This program
provided federal funds to help states make maintenance payments for children who
were eligible for cash assistance and who lived in foster care. Initially, most of these
funds went to foster care payments. See id. In 1980, this program was transferred to a
new Title IV-E of the SSA. See Social Security Act, Title IV-E, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act ("CAPTA") to provide limited funding to states to prevent, identify,
and treat child abuse and neglect. See Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106h, 5116, 5118a-e (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). CAPTA created the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, developed standards for receiving and
responding to reports of child maltreatment, and established a clearinghouse on the
prevention and treatment of abuse and neglect. Changes in 1997 reinforced the Act's
emphasis on child safety. See Schene, supra note 55, at 28.
163. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887, 889 (1975).
164. See Shotton, supra note 151, at 224.
165. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in
Two States, 29 Fam. L.Q. 121, 122 (1995) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Children in Foster
Care].
166. See id. at 122-25 (noting the difficulties that children faced in the foster care
system in the 1970s and discussing federal legislation passed in response).
167. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §
1, 194 Stat. 500, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994).
168. See S. Rep. No. 96-336, at 10 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448,
1459.
169. See Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What To Do About It:
Is the Problem that Too Many Children are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or
That Too Many Children are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L 141, 142
(1999) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Foster Care Dilemma].
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required states that sought to maximize federal funding to establish
programs and make procedural reforms that would serve children in
their own homes, prevent out-of-home placement, and facilitate
family reunification following placement.17
The CWA established the murky "reasonable efforts" standard as
the guideline for both placement prevention, the goal of which was to
avoid placing the child outside the home at all, and for reunifying the
child with his family.17' To receive funding under the CWA, state
child welfare agencies were mandated to "make 'reasonable efforts' to
maintain children with their families or, if this is not possible.., make
reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the family.' ' 72 Placements
were to be made with the preferred ranking as reunification, adoption,
guardianship, and long-term out-of-home care. 73 Thus, through the
Act, Congress shifted the focus of child welfare from foster care to
permanency, which was preferred through family reunification, and
also through permanent adoption. 74 Although the CWA aimed to
protect children by reducing reliance on foster care, the number of
children in foster care has increased rather than decreased since its
enactment.
175
These disappointing results led Congress to pass the ASFA. 176 This
legislation emerged in a policy climate that "stressed individual
responsibility and programmatic accountability.' 1 77 ASFA represents
a legislative acknowledgement that the foster care system was further
harming abused children instead of helping them. 78  ASFA
announced a new standard by which placement options would be
evaluated: "[T]he child's health and safety shall be the paramount
concern."' 79 This focus reflects a shift from the prior emphasis on
reunifying biological parents and their children. ASFA thus seeks to
170. See Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 287, 288.
171. See id.
172. Shotton, supra note 151, at 223.
173. See Thomas P. McDonald et al., Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Foster
Care: A Research Synthesis 13 (1996).
174. See Kim, supra note 170, at 289.
175. See Bailie, supra note 40, at 2291 & n.51.
176. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). ASFA re-authorizes and increases funding for the Family
Preservation and Support program, while changing its name to "Promoting Safe and
Stable Families." The support services included under this program are counseling,
substance abuse treatment services, mental health services, domestic violence
services, temporary child care, and transportation for services. See 42 U.S.C. §
629a(a)(7)(B) (Supp. III 1997).
177. Ernestine Steward Gray, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997:
Confronting an American Tragedy, 46 La. B.J. 477, 478 (1999).
178. See Kim, supra note 170, at 288.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added); Kim, supra note
170, at 309.
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strike a balance between family preservation and reunification, and
the health and safety of children."0
Although ASFA represents a shift from the reunification focus, it
retains a modified requirement that agencies continue to make
reasonable efforts to "preserve and reunify" families.' This
reunification effort must be done with the child's safety in mind."
The reasonable efforts requirement applies unless a court determines
aggravating circumstances exist.'8' Aggravating circumstances are
defined by state law, but may include abandonment, chronic physical
abuse, or sexual abuse."M Additionally, the requirement may be
dispensed with if the parent has committed particular crimes against
the child or against the other parent, such as murder, manslaughter, or
participating in the planning of such an act, or committing serious
bodily injury."8 Additionally, reasonable efforts to reunify are not
required if the parent's rights to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily. 6
Congress changed the name of what was formerly a dispositional
hearing'17 to a permanency hearing to reflect ASFA's overall stability
goal.1" It also changed the time frame for a permanency hearing,
which now must be held no later than twelve months after a child
enters foster care." This is shortened from the previous eighteen-
month standard. In addition, if the judge determines that reasonable
efforts to reunite the child with the biological parents are not
required, a permanency hearing must be held within thirty days of
that determination. 9 ' At the permanency hearing, the court considers
whether and when a child will be (1) returned to the parent; (2)
planned for adoption and referred for termination of parental rights;
(3) referred for legal guardianship; or (4) referred for another
permanent living arrangement.'
ASFA concretely advances its permanency focus in two ways. First,
ASFA requires states to move children from foster care into
permanent homes more quickly by terminating parental rights earlier.
If a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-
180. See Gray, supra note 177, at 478.
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (Supp. III 1997).
182. See id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
183. See id § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
184. See id
185. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(I)-(IV).
186. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
187. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text for a description of the
dispositional hearing.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (Supp. III 1997).
189. See id. Under ASFA, the date that a child "enters foster care" is either when
a court finds that the child has been abused or neglected, or 60 days after the child is
removed from the home, whichever is earlier. See id. § 675(5)(F).
190. See id § 671(a)(15)(E)(i).
191. See id. § 675(5)(C).
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two months, or a court has determined an infant child abandoned, the
state must file a petition to terminate parental rights.192 The state
must also concurrently identify and approve a qualified family for
adoption. 93 Second, ASFA promotes permanency by encouraging
adoptions194 through giving a bounty to the state of $4000 to $6000 for
each foster child adopted over a baseline number.195 This base
number is calculated according to the average number of adoptions in
the state in prior fiscal years. 96
To continue receiving federal funding, each state was required to
enact its own legislation to comply with ASFA.Y7 Under Title IV of
the Social Security Act, the federal government reimburses the states
for eligible foster care and adoption expenditures. 198 Failure to
comply could result in a serious loss of funding. In proposing its
compliance legislation, the New York State Senate estimated a
potential loss of over $600 million in federal funding if the state did
not meet ASFA's commands. 199
2. New York State Child Protection Laws Enacted to Comply with
ASFA
In addition to Chapter 7 of the New York laws that aimed generally
to comply with ASFA, the New York Senate and Assembly submitted
a bill2°° that proposes to amend certain provisions of the Family Court
Act ("FCA") to encourage efforts to find a non-custodial parent. °0
The legislation focuses on changing statutory provisions that address
the notification procedures to family members, specifically to non-
custodial (non-respondent) parents, which recently have been
192. See id. § 675(5)(E).
193. Seeid.
194. See H.R. Rep. 105-77, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2739-
40; Kim, supra note 170, at 309-10; see also Garland, supra note 127 ("The push is on
at the federal and state levels to get adoptable children into permanent homes more
quickly.").
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d) (Supp. III 1997). The additional $2000 is based on the
number of special needs adoptions. See id. § 673b(d)(1)(B).
196. See id. § 673b(g)(3)(A)-(B).
197. New York State enacted its legislation in February 1999. See 1999 N.Y. Laws 7
(McKinney 1999).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 674(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
199. See Assembly Passes Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, Assembly
Action Highlights (Feb. 12, 1999) <http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/Weekly/
199990212.html>.
200. See S. 5117-A, A. 962-A, 222d Legis. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999). The Assembly
passed its version on June 21, 1999. The Senate did not vote on the bill in the last
legislative session. It has been automatically reintroduced in the 2000 session.
201. See Bill Memo in Support of S. 5117-A, An Act to Amend the Family Court
Act and Social Services Law, In relation to Facilitating Permanency Planning for
Children in Foster Care, 222d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter S. 5117-A Bill
Memo].
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challenged in federal litigation." 2 The statute currently mandates that
"relatives of the child" be notified of a child's removal and
consideration for placement. 3 Father-litigants have challenged the
vagueness of this language and argue that it does not adequately
protect their parental rights. The proposed legislation adds language
directing that notice be rendered specifically to the non-respondent
parent, as well as to other relatives. Despite its seeming reunification
presumption, this legislation falls under the rubric of complying with
ASFA because it aims to make more rapid, permanent placements,
thereby decreasing a child's stay in temporary foster care.
For those children involuntarily removed from their homes, the bill
would amend the FCA to require the child protection agency to
conduct an immediate investigation to locate any non-respondent
parent and any relatives of the child to inform them of the
proceedings.? The new language repeatedly adds "non-respondent
parent" to the language that currently reads "person related to the
child.""' If that parent is not ultimately a custodial resource, their
information, at a minimum, will be available for notification at a later
stage, particularly for a termination of parental rights proceeding,
The direct reference to "non-respondent" parent is arguably a
legislative attempt to place that parent in an elevated position in these
proceedings. However, the language remains vague as to the specific
measures to be employed and as to what type or level of search will be
deemed satisfactory.
The proposed language to the provisions governing the surrender of
a child by a parent into child protective services20 requires that the
parent executing the surrender provide information regarding "the
other parent, any person to whom the surrendering parent had been
married at the time of the conception or birth of the child," and any
other person entitled to notice of a termination of parental rights
proceeding.2  Failure to provide the information, however, does not
invalidate the surrender.2°0 Under the bill, in preparing for foster care
review, the CPS official shall have a "continuing duty to obtain
202. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
203. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1017 (McKinney 1999).
204. See S. 5117-A § 1, 222d Legis. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (regarding N.Y. Fam. Ct.
Act § 1017).
205. Id. The non-respondent parent is typically the noncustodial parent, as the
respondent is the parent or legal guardian responsible for the child's care who is
alleged to have abused or neglected that child. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(a)
(McKinney 1999).
206. See S. 5117-A Bill Memo, supra note 201.
207. See S. 5117-A § 3, 222d Legis. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (regarding N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 383-c); id. § 4 (regarding N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384).
208. S. 5117 § 3, 222d Legis. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
209. See id This lack of punishment weakens the force of the requirement and its
intended effect.
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information.., from the parent or other individual who placed the
child or through further investigation ....,,Z0
These changes seemingly aim to protect parents' rights. However,
the absence of punitive measures for the surrendering parent's failure
to provide information does not enhance the possibilities for finding
and notifying the non-custodial parent. Further, by stating the goal of
having the information available for later proceedings, specifically
TPR proceedings, the bill's language leads to the conclusion that these
parents are not truly viewed as placement resources.
The statutory changes of ASFA and its complementary state law
provisions, as seen in New York, indicate a shift toward permanent
placements without set formulae. The presumption toward placement
with a biological parent thereby weakened, courts and agencies can
focus on what is truly best for the child and develop plans to meet
those interests more quickly. The Supreme Court exhibited a similar
focus by emphasizing the quality of the parent-child relationship
beyond a mere biological status inquiry. The next part analyzes the
Court's holdings in the family law area.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FAMILY: A Focus ON THE
QUALITY OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
This part details the Court's evaluation of the familial privacy
interest. It begins with the Court's treatment of the family generally,
then proceeds to examine those cases addressing the notice rights
granted to unwed fathers and foster parents. The Court's analysis is
then used as a basis for interpreting the rights that legal fathers should
be afforded. This part also examines the elements of proper
procedure, particularly in the context of child protection and custody
proceedings.
A. Due Process and the Family
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."2 1 The Supreme Court has held that to
make out a claim of deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights, a plaintiff must demonstrate first that he has been
deprived of liberty or property in the constitutional sense.212 Second,
he must demonstrate that the procedure used to deprive him of that
interest was constitutionally defective.213
The Court has long retreated from a formalistic, rigid interpretation
210. Id. § 6 (amending N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 392) (emphasis added).
211. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
212. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972).
213. See id. at 571-72.
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of due process procedural protections,24 repeating that due process
"is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances."21 5  Nonetheless, the requirement of
fundamental fairness remains constant. Fundamental fairness,
however, has a "meaning... as opaque as its importance is lofty.9216
Applying the Due Process Clause is thus "an uncertain enterprise. '21 7
Determining fundamental fairness involves considering relevant
precedents and assessing the interests at stake.28
Once the interest is identified, a balancing test must be applied. In
Mathews v. Eldridge,21 9 the Court identified three factors to be applied
in any due process analysis.' These factors are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.21
Thus, analyzing due process claims involves establishing that the right
of which the individual claims to have been deprived is protected, and
then evaluating the deprivation procedures. In family law, this
analysis begins with the Supreme Court's recognition and protection
of a privacy interest in the family, and proceeds by analyzing the
procedures that allegedly infringe upon that interest.
The Supreme Court has long recognized a privacy interest in the
family,' holding that choices about family life and the upbringing of
children are among the associational rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment,." as well as by the Equal Protection
Clause"4 and the Ninth Amendment. 5  Parents thus have a
fundamental right to the custody and companionship of their
214. See id. at 572.
215. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (quoting
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895 (1961)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 24-25.
218. See id
219. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
220. See id. at 335.
221. Id.
222. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
223. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,639-40 (1974); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923).
224. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a
sterilization law that disproportionately affected minorities as violative of the equal
protection clause, because marriage and procreation are fundamental rights of man).
225. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the Ninth Amendment recognizes the right of
privacy in marriage as fundamental even though it is not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution).
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children. 26  This right has been deemed "essential, 227 one of the
"basic civil rights of man,"2 8 and "far more precious ... than property
rights. 229 In Prince v. Massachusetts, 0 the Court stated that "[I]t is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. '23'
In 1981, the Court reaffirmed the line of decisions following Prince by
stating that "a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an important
interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection."'" 2 Thus, parents have a protected
interest in their relationship with their child, and this relationship may
be intruded upon only through proper procedure.
Procedural due process applies only to interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3  When such interests are at stake, "the
right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount."' Due process of
law, however, does not require a hearing in every possible case of
government impairment of a private interest.235  The Court has
advised that "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." 6 A person may
be deprived of a protected interest without a hearing only in
extraordinary circumstances where some valid governmental interest
is at stake that justifies delaying the hearing until after the event.237
226. See In re C.A.T., Jr., No. 01-A-01-9510-JV-00474, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS
291, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 1996).
227. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
228. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
229. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (acknowledging the Court's consistent recognition that the
parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (noting that the liberty interest in family
privacy has its contours in "intrinsic human rights"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the Court's many
decisions recognizing freedom of personal choice in matters of family life as a liberty
protected by the due process clause); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974) (same); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (same).
230. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
231. Id. at 166.
232. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
233. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & n.7 (1972) (holding that
plaintiff must first demonstrate he has been denied liberty or property in the
constitutional sense).
234. Id. at 569-70.
235. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
236. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971); accord Roth, 408 U.S. at
573.
237. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7. The Court has rarely found such circumstances
to be present. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598
(1950) (stating that no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so
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Any claim to a pre-deprivation hearing is premised on the concept
that total relief cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing.23
When a hearing is required, it must "be 'at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner."' 9 Further, the opportunity to be heard must
be tailored to the "capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard."2' The Court has stated that "[t]he very nature of due process
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation," and has established that the procedures
due process may require are determined by the circumstances.241
The Supreme Court has cautioned that foster care involves "issues
of unusual delicacy... where professional judgments regarding
desirable procedures are constantly and rapidly changing. ' '2 2
Consequently, federal courts should hesitate to "import rigidity of
procedure" into this area where the state's interest is great, but where
there also exists a need for flexibility to accomplish what is best for
the child.243 Nevertheless, the minimum requirements of procedural
due process are a matter of federal law, and procedures that the state
deems adequate do not automatically satisfy the constitutionally
required protection.2' There is then a need to reconcile the state's
interest with the constitutional mandate.
Many social services and domestic relations statutes incorporate
presumptions favoring a party in the proceeding.2 - For example, the
long as the requisite hearing is held before final administrative order becomes
effective); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) (stating that where
only property rights are involved, postponement of judicial inquiry is not a denial of
due process if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the
liability is adequate); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921)
(discussing Congress's right during war to immediately seize property thought to
belong to the enemy).
238. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976).
239. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,267 (1970) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
240. Id. at 269.
241. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 (addressing the procedural protections required
to terminate welfare payments).
242. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
855 (1977).
243. Gibson v. Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582, 589 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that the procedures afforded foster parents to contest the removal
of an adopted foster child from their home were adequate to protect whatever liberty
interests they may have had in their relationship with the child).
244. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480,491 (1980)).
245. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-56b (West 1995) (stating that in custody
disputes between parents and non-parents, "there shall be a presumption that it is in
the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent"); see also Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 722.25 (West 1993) (stating that in a dispute between the parent and an
agency or third person, "it is presumed that the best interests of the child are served
by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is established by
clear and convincing evidence").
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parental presumption is the historical view that the child's best
interest is usually served by remaining with the natural parent.246 The
parental preference doctrine is a rule of law designed to protect the
constitutional due process rights of a natural parent to the custody of
his or her children.247
Not all presumptions, however, are constitutional. In Stanley v.
Illinois,248 for example, the Court struck down a state statute with an
automatic presumption against unwed fathers in custody suits. 249 The
Court stated that procedure by presumption "is always cheaper and
easier than individualized determination. But when ... the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of
both parent and child.""2  The Court criticized the statute for
presuming, rather than proving, a father's unfitness purely out of
convenience.5 1  Under the Due Process Clause, convenience is
"insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at
246. See O'Brien, supra note 94, at 1215. In recent years, numerous state cases
have continued to adhere to this proposition. See, e.g., P.G. v. W.M.T., 590 So. 2d 329,
330 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (applying presumption that in a custody determination
between a parent and a third party, the natural parent will be presumed to serve the
best interests of the child absent a showing of the natural parent's unfitness); Appeal
of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1143 (D.C. 1990) (finding the proper standard for evaluating
an unwed father's rights to be the best-interests-of-the-child standard that
incorporates a preference for a fit unwed father who has grasped his opportunity
interest); Rose v. Potts, 577 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding a
presumption for the natural parent, but qualifying it as not absolute and as only a
factor in the best-interests-of-the-child analysis); Westphal v. Westphal, 457 N.W.2d
226, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (denying intervention application of grandparents in
custody dispute by applying the two doctrines governing custody disputes between
parents and nonparents: first, the natural parent must be shown unfit; second, the
best-interests-of-the-child standard governs); Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164,
166 (Tex. 1990) (finding the appropriate standard in parent versus nonparent custody
battles to be presumption toward the natural parent unless placement with that
parent would not be in the child's best interest and such placement would significantly
impair the child's physical health or emotional development (citing Tex. Fain. Code
Ann. § 14.01(b) (West 1990)) (emphasis added); Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 244
(Va. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring clear and convincing evidence either that the parents
are unfit, voluntarily relinquished the child, abandoned the child, or special facts and
circumstances "constitute extraordinary reasons to take the child from the parents"
before overcoming the presumption favoring a natural parent); Bancroft v. Bancroft,
578 A.2d 114, 117 (Vt. 1990) (reiterating that a parent has a fundamental right to
custody and that the presumption that the best interests of the child are served by
granting custody to a natural parent may be overcome only in extraordinary
circumstances). But see In re Guardianship of Williams, 869 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Kan.
1994) (overruling the use of the best-interests-of-the-child standard in a custody
dispute between a natural parent and grandparent).
247. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d 680, 688 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
248. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
249. See id. at 656-58.
250. Id. at 656-57.
251. See id. at 658.
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stake is the dismemberment of his family."2'  Therefore, statutory
presumptions must still protect due process rights.
Due process becomes most important and most contested when the
state seeks to terminate parental rights. When a father's rights are
terminated, he loses all opportunity for contact and a relationship with
his child. 3 The Fourteenth Amendment affords parents faced with
the possibility of losing their children important due process rights.!
These parents are entitled to a hearing and adequate noticel 5 and are
entitled to legal representation when the circumstances so require. - 6
Further, the state must support its petition by clear and convincing
evidence.' 57 The protection required is commensurate with the
irreversible harm at stake.
In the child custody context, state statutes provide procedures to
protect the varying rights of the parties to child protection and
placement proceedings. These procedures largely focus on notice and
opportunity to be heard on a child's placement decisions after
removal, or when an adoption is pending, and the efforts required of
government agencies to guarantee such notice to the individuals
involved. In New York, for example, after an emergency removal, the
person authorized to make such a removal must "make every
reasonable effort to inform the parent... of the facility to which he
has brought the child," and to "give, coincident with removal, written
notice to the parent ... of the right to apply to the family court for the
return of the child.""8 This notice shall be personally served on the
parent at the residence from which the child was removed, and a copy
of the notice shall be mailed within twenty-four hours." 9 For hearings
on whether to extend temporary placements, notice of the hearing
must be provided to the parent who will be a party entitled to
participate in the hearing. '  Unless the court directs otherwise, this
notice will be made by mail to the parent's last known address at least
eight days prior to the hearing. 26' The hearing may not begin until
252. I.
253. For a discussion of the procedure for terminating parental rights, see supra
notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
254. See In re C.A.T., Jr., No. 01-A-01-9510-JV-00474. 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS
291, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 1996).
255. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (holding that to deny an unwed father a hearing
when his children are taken because the mother of the children dies, while extending
such a hearing to all other parents whose custody is challenged, denies him equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
256. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
257. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (striking down statutes
with lower evidentiary standards).
258. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act. § 1024(b)(ii)-(iii) (McKinney 1999).
259. See id. § 1024(b)(iii).
260. See id § 1055(b)(iii).
261. See id.
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proof that the parent received actual notice is provided to the court.262
New York's notice provisions demonstrate both compliance with the
law and the lack of specificity as to how these provisions are to be
implemented.
B. The Rights of Parties to Foster Care Proceedings
The physiological differences between men and women have
resulted in the grant of differing rights to biological mothers and
fathers. 63 The mother's parental relationship stems from giving birth
and is more biologically clear than the father's parental relationship,
providing her with full legal rights without need for scientific or legal
determination.2" Fathers, on the other hand, have been granted
different kinds of rights in the Court's jurisprudence, where lines have
been drawn based on biological, legal, and emotional relationships.
1. The Rights of Unwed Fathers: A Relationship-Based Inquiry
The Supreme Court cases addressing the rights of unwed fathers
provide insight into how the Court views the father-child relationship
and serve as a background for determining the rights of legal fathers.
The cases addressing foster parents similarly provide insight into how
the court views the family in a contract-based setting.
The Supreme Court has specifically addressed the rights of unwed
fathers five times, 65 and its decisions have rested on different
constitutional grounds. First, in Stanley v. Illinois,266 the biological
father, who lived with the children's mother and helped raise the
children, challenged an Illinois law requiring the children of unwed
fathers to be taken into state custody upon the mother's death.267
Under the statute, the unwed father was not entitled to any hearing on
the children's placement. The Court struck down the law, stating that
a father's interest in the children he has raised warrants protection.26 s
The Court held that the automatic destruction of the custodial
relationship, without giving the father an opportunity to argue his
fitness as a parent, violated the Due Process Clause.269 What
remained unclear from the Court's decision, however, was whether
262. See id.
263. See Cashman, supra note 29, at 960.
264. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is
clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other
measures.").
265. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
266. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
267. See id. at 646, 649.
268. See id. at 650-51.
269. See id. at 658.
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the unwed father's right existed in every case, or whether the right
stemmed from "the existence of a traditional family unit, a long-term
custodial relationship with the children, or both." 211
Stanley appears to support a strong father's rights stance.
Subsequent cases addressing the rights of biological fathers, however,
have narrowed the scope of this constitutional protection. -" ' The
following three cases involved unwed fathers attempting to block or
vacate the adoption of their children by the husbands of the children's
mothers. In Caban v. Mohammed,2fl the Court held that a New York
statute permitting an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to
block adoption proceedings by withholding consent violated equal
protectionV3 The biological father in that case, although no longer in
a relationship with the child's mother, maintained contact with his son
for six years.'7 While the Court did not address the father's due
process claim,275 it did expand the Stanley decision to include
protecting men who maintain relationships with their children, even if
outside the traditional family unit.27 6
In an apparent shift, the Court in Quilloin v. Walcott" upheld a
Georgia statute that authorized an adoption by a stepfather over the
objection of the biological father. 78 The biological father had never
legitimated the child, had not sought visitation rights until the
adoption petition was filed, and had provided support only on an
irregular basis 9 The child, who was fourteen when the case was
decided, 0 had lived with his mother and stepfather from the age of
three." 1 The adoption by the stepfather would legally recognize an
already existing family.' Under these circumstances, the Court
found that the state was not required to find anything more than that
the adoption was in the best interest of the child,"- ' because the state
has a "strong state policy of rearing children in a family setting."' By
implication, the Court refined its holding in Stanley by denying rights
to an inactive father.'
Focusing again on the quality of the father-child relationship, the
270. Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 709.
271. See Kaas, supra note 54, at 1074.
272. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
273. See id at 394.
274. See id. at 389.
275. See id
276. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 711.
277. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
27& See id at 255.
279. See id at 251,256.
280. See id at 246-47.
281. See id at 247.
282. See id at 255.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 252.
285. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 709.
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Court held in Lehr v. Robertson216 that a biological father who was
uninvolved in his child's life did not have a right to contest adoption
proceedings. 2 7 In the Court's view, the biological connection between
father and child was significant in the unique opportunity it offered
the father to develop a relationship."' 8 However, if the father failed to
grasp that opportunity, the "Constitution will not automatically
compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
interests lie."289 Again, the nature of the father-child relationship was
examined in determining constitutional protection.
Returning to its theme of support for the marital unit,90 in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.291' the Court denied the attempts of a father of a child
born of an adulterous affair to establish visitation and paternity
rights.292  The Court asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects those interests that are fundamental to society, such as the
institution of the family.293  Therefore, the status of the legal
relationship between the parents is a factor in defining the scope of
the constitutional protection.294 The Court did not find support for
protecting this type of relationship anywhere in its jurisprudence.
In sum, the Court has established that unwed fathers have a right to
protect their relationship with their children. That right, however, is
not absolute. 29  Rather, it is predicated on a court finding that the
father has made sufficient contacts and efforts to establish a
relationship prior to the threatened legal proceedings.296 The Court
has noted that "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent and child. They require
relationships more enduring. ' '29 Similarly, states have recognized that
286. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
287. See id. at 267-68.
288. See id. at 262.
289. Id.
290. This sentiment was expressed in Quilloin. See supra notes 277-84 and
accompanying text.
291. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
292. See id. at 113-17.
293. See id. at 122-23.
294. See id. at 123-24.
295. Compare Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) (finding that a father's
due process rights were not violated by a lack of notice of adoption proceedings
because he had not established a substantial relationship with his child), with Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (allowing a father to attempt to block a third-
party adoption because he had an existing relationship with his child that was worthy
of constitutional protection).
296. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (noting that father did not "grasp[] that opportunity"
to develop a relationship with his child because he waited until after the adoption
petition was filed before attempting to assert his parental rights); Caban, 441 U.S. at
389, 393 (holding not only that a father had demonstrated a commitment to a
relationship with his children, but also that a substantial relationship existed between
the father and his children because he lived with the unwed biological mother and the
children for several years); Cashman, supra note 29, at 967.
297. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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"[a] bare assertion of parental natural right cannot prevail against the
clear best interests of the children and the overwhelming evidence of
disinterest and abandonment. '29 The unwed father's rights can only
be evaluated in context, and are weighed against the best interest of
the child. These qualifications lend support to similarly restricting the
parental rights of legal fathers.2'
The Court's decisions gave the states little guidance in defining the
rights of unwed fathers.' °  Many states have addressed this
uncertainty by establishing paternity registries."' The registry places
the burden for protecting the legal relationship between father and
child on the father. 2  Once registered with the appropriate state
agency, the father insures that he will be notified of any petition filed
to adopt the child. 3 This right to notice is not the equivalent of full
parental rights, but merely entitles him to notification of a hearing at
which he may argue against the pending adoption as being against the
child's best interest.'
States have taken three approaches to establishing deadlines
beyond which the father cannot register. -  The most common
approach is to specify an amount of time measured from the child's
date of birth, with thirty days being the most prevalent.' Another
approach is to allow registration until the adoption petition is filed.-"
A third approach is more of a hybrid that provides for a registration
period, but also provides the father with the ability to file a paternity
action after the deadline has passed to protect his right to notice.-"
Failing to register can have severe consequences. In New York, for
example, if the father fails to register, his rights may be automatically
terminated and the child adopted without his knowledge.-" This type
of statute assumes that a father who does not file with the registry is
not a good father and will never be one.1 Other states take a less
extreme stance and require an attempt to identify and notify the
unwed father of the adoption proceedings, even if he failed to register
298. State v. Hernandez, 259 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Neb. 1977) (finding the parents'
lack of interest in their children for six years constituted abandonment and was a
ground for terminating their parental rights).
299. See infra Part III.
300. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 705.
301. See id. Twenty-six states thus far have created paternity registries. See id. at
n.2
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 716.
306. See id.
307. See id at 718.
308. See id. at 719.
309. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111-a(6) (McKinney 1997).
310. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 705.
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in a timely fashion.311 For the unwed father who wants to undertake
the responsibility of parenting, paternity registries provide a means of
protecting the father's relationship with his child.312
The Court has not specifically addressed the rights of legal fathers.
Its treatment has been limited to recognizing a legal father's rights as
superseding those of an unwed father's claim.313 No measures similar
to the putative father registry have been required. By implication, the
act of marriage is sufficient recognition of the paternal role.
Nonetheless, this Note argues that marrying the mother should not
enhance the paternal relationship's constitutional protection if the
father has neither pursued nor seized a parenting role. The
relationship with the child must be separately examined.
2. The Rights of Foster Parents: Emphasizing the Form of a
Relationship over Its Substance
In addressing the rights of foster parents, the Supreme Court has
moved away from a relationship-based analysis and has emphasized
instead the contractual nature of the relationship between the child,
foster parent, and state. The Court addressed the liberty interest of
foster parents in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform ("OFFER")."4 In that case, foster parents alleged that
the procedures for removal of foster children under the New York
Social Service Law315 violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 6 The Court first analyzed
whether the foster parents' asserted liberty interest was an interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 7 In evaluating the family
interest, the Court acknowledged that the importance of the familial
relationship stems from the emotional attachments that derive from
family intimacy as well as from the connection of a blood
relationship.318
The Court, however, noted important distinctions between a foster
311. See id. at 723-24.
312. See id. at 726.
313. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (finding that where
a child born of an extramarital affair is born into an existing marital family, the
"natural father's unique opportunity [interest in a relationship with the child] conflicts
with the similarly unique opportunity [interest] of the husband of the marriage; and it
is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the latter").
314. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
315. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 383(2), 400 (McKinney 1992). Under the statutes,
a foster parent who had cared for a child for at least 12 months was permitted to
intervene in custody proceedings. See id. § 383(3). A foster parent who believes a
social services official's removal of a child from the foster home was improper also
has the right to appeal. See id. § 400(2).
316. See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 820.
317. See id. at 839.
318. See id. at 844.
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family and a natural family.3 19 First, a foster family relationship is
rooted in state law and contract,- while the liberty interest in family
privacy is ordinarily found in "intrinsic human rights."' Second,
finding a liberty interest for foster parents not only weighs against the
state's interest, but also against the natural parents' constitutionally
protected interest .3  The Court illustrated the difference in this way:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest
against arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like
associations into which they have freely entered, even in the absence
of biological connection or state-law recognition of the relationship.
It is quite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the
face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that
derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human
right-an interest the foster parent has recognized by contract from
the outset.
323
Consequently, "[w]hatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in
the foster family as an institution, that interest must be substantially
attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to
return the child to his natural parents. '"" The Court, however, did
not resolve the liberty interest issue, as it rooted its holding in the
constitutionally defective nature of the pre-removal procedures. '-
Expansions on this limited holding have evolved in subsequent
cases. A federal district court judge recently found that foster parents
who have almost exclusively raised the child are entitled to certain
319. See it at 845.
320. See id The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits utilized this distinction in ruling
that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See, e.g.,
Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693,699 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(concluding that the liberty interest question left open by the Supreme Court in
OFFER should be decided against establishing a liberty interest in the foster family
relationship); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs.,
563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (finding that true liberty rights do not
have their origin in state law as does the foster family relationship, but in -notions of
intrinsic human rights"); Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728,741 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(rejecting the liberty interest of a foster parent because of the contractual nature of
the relationship under which a liberty interest could not truly develop), affd, 644 F.2d
542, 543 (6th Cir.) (per curiam). State courts likewise have agreed that a strong
emotional bond may develop in a foster care situation, but have declined to
characterize it as a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See, e.g., In re Jaivuan
Martin, Nos. 17432, 17461, 17464, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3999, at *6-*7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 1999) (holding that a foster care relationship is not constitutionally
protected). Similarly, Ohio limits the intervention power of grandparents in adoption
proceedings to those cases where they themselves are seeking to adopt. See id. at 7-
*8.
321. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845.
322. See i. at 846.
323. Id-
324. Id. at 846-47.
325. See id. at 847. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart asserted that he
would have held that these interests are not the type protected by the Due Process
Clause. See id. at 858 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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procedural protections in adoption proceedings.3 26 The court engaged
in a detailed factual analysis of the relationship between the foster
parent and child in determining whether it should be afforded
constitutional protection. 327  Again, the nature of the relationship
between the parent-figure and child defined the contours of the
constitutional protection. 32  The foster child also has been held to
have some rights in these proceedings. For example, one federal
district court recently held that a foster child had a right to a hearing
prior to removal from the home of a foster parent who is a relative.3 29
These cases, while not wholly granting foster parents and children a
protected liberty interest, do advance the ideas expressed in OFFER
aimed at protecting the bonds formed in these contractual family
situations.
The significance of the foster family relationship is also apparent in
certain state statutes. For example, Arizona, Rhode Island, and South
Carolina allow foster parents to file petitions to terminate the rights of
the birth parents.330 Other states qualify this right based on the
amount of time the child has lived with the foster parents.331 In
jurisdictions such as New York, foster parents can initiate termination
proceedings only after the court orders an agency to bring termination
proceedings and the agency fails to do so within ninety days.32
Another option is to provide notice to a foster parent or relative with
whom the child has been placed when the agency seeks permanent
custody of the child or seeks to place the child for adoption. The
burden is then placed on the foster parent seeking to adopt to express
her interest to the agency, and the agency then informs her of how to
proceed.333 Under this type of procedure, once informed of this desire
to adopt, the agency gives priority to the foster parent or relative
when determining placement, unless such placement is not in the
child's best interest.334 Under the most expansive view, some states
permit "interested persons" to initiate adoption proceedings. 335 Thus,
while the Court in OFFER refused to fully recognize a liberty interest
in the foster family relationship, subsequent case law and statutes
326. See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
327. See id. at 195-96.
328. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the relationship-based constitutional analysis
of the rights of unwed fathers).
329. See Harley v. City of New York, 36 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), afd
No. 99-7314, 99-7628, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4482, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2000).
330. See Carrieri, Handbook, supra note 64, at 73-74.
331. For example, in New Hampshire, a foster parent can file a petition to
terminate parental rights when they have had custody of the child for 24 months, or if
the agency fails to file the petition after the foster parent requests it. See id. at 75.
332. See id.
333. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5103.16.1 (West 1996).
334. See id.
335. These states include Alabama, Arizona, and Idaho. See Carrieri, Handbook,
supra note 64, at 74.
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manifest recognition of the importance of the relationship and protect
it accordingly.
The Court's treatment of the family in its due process decisions
emphasizes biological and legal connection and rewards active
parenting. But biology alone is insufficient to confer legal rights on a
parent as revealed by the Court's holdings in the unwed father
cases.336 Strong relationships, if rooted outside the traditional family,
are also not a guarantee of parental rights. The balance struck
between biology and active parenting militates in favor of subjecting
legal fathers to an active parenting test. Part III argues for the
application of such a standard in the foster care context and assesses
its benefits and potential drawbacks.
III. PROMOTING ACTIVE PARENTING REDUCES THE HARMS TO
CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND EXTENDED PLACEMENT IN
FOSTER CARE
This part argues that courts should grant inactive legal fathers a
limited protected liberty interest in their relationships with their
children. This interest must be evaluated within the context of the
father's efforts to develop his relationship with his child in the same
manner in which an unwed father's efforts are evaluated. A legal
father's interest is further checked by the state's important interest in
protecting children from harm and encouraging rapid permanent
placement when children have been removed from their mothers.
Consequently, this limited interest deserves minimal procedural
protection.
The procedures currently in place in states such as New York
mandate that the child welfare agency seek out family members as
resources for the child upon removal from the home. This search
includes locating the non-custodial father. Those fathers who have
maintained contact and a relationship with the child, however, vill
naturally make such a search easier and faster. A father with a strong
presence in a child's life, whether generated through financial,
emotional, or social bonds, will more likely be detected by the search
than one who has been absent from his child's life. It is reasonable for
the child welfare agency to expect to locate active parents at the
beginning of their search, and upon finding them, to either approve or
eliminate them preliminarily as a viable placement option. The child
welfare agency should not be required to take extraordinary measures
above and beyond a thorough initial search in locating inactive
parents, and therefore, should not be required to conduct time-
consuming searches at later stages that delay a child's permanent
placement. A diligent search at the outset of the child's removal
affords an absentee legal father with sufficient notice and opportunity
336. See supra Part II.B.1.
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to come before the court and participate in permanency planning.
From there, the agency can proceed to petition for the termination of
parental rights utilizing additional notice procedures, such as
publication, to insure that the father's rights are protected at the
termination stage. The measures already taken will ease and quicken
this process and benefit both the state and father. The state benefits
from speed and efficiency, and the father will have been notified at
the earliest possible time so that he can seek custody or prepare to
oppose the termination.
As recent federal legislation highlights, 337 state child protection
proceedings must focus on the health and safety of the child.
Therefore, automatic favoritism of biological reunification cannot
automatically meet such a standard. While such a presumption can be
rebutted, its existence encourages courts to place the child with the
biological parent out of convenience. Therefore, the only proper
presumption is one that looks to the health and safety of the child,
independent of other factors. The rights of the legal father must be
evaluated under this presumption.
A. Liberty Interest
Theoretically, at least, the Supreme Court does not make policy
decisions, and it must react only to actual "cases and controversies"
that parties bring before it.338 The Court's holdings in the family area
may be viewed as quite narrow under this doctrine.39 Each case is
fact specific, with no two situations bearing the exact same set of
circumstances. What has then developed is a "patchwork of
decisions" that has not comprehensively addressed many issues in the
area of family rights." As a result, those holdings mark the "outer
limits" of how states can legislate, and serve as guideposts to state
legislatures.4
The Court's cases addressing the rights of unwed biological
fathers 2 lead to the "conclusion that biological parenthood plus an
established parental relationship creates a protectable liberty interest
in parental rights." 3  The Court has alluded to a distinction between
the interests of an unwed father' and those of a separated or
337. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. 1997);
supra Part I.C.1.
338. See Kaas, supra note 54, at 1071 n.113.
339. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confitsed Constitutional Status and Meaning
of Parental Rights, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 975, 985 (1988).
340. Id.
341. Kaas, supra note 54, at 1071 n.113.
342. See supra Part III.A.
343. Hillary R. Stein, Note, Massachusetts' "Lizzie's Law": Protection for Children
or Violation of Parents' Constitutional Rights?, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1558-59 (1998).
344. A putative father is the child's biological father who was not married to the
child's natural mother at the time of the child's birth. See Black's Law Dictionary 623
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divorced father, but has not specified the rights of the latter.-' * In
Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court stated that the unwed father's rights
were "readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced
father."'  The legal status of marriage, whether it be current or not,
presumably gives the father an elevated status. The state could
therefore potentially provide the unwed father with less veto power
over a proposed adoption than it would a married, separated, or
divorced father.47 In Quilloin, the Court stated its belief that "legal
custody of children is... a central aspect of the marital relationship,
and even a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne
full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of
the marriage." The Court apparently presumed that the marital
relationship entails active parenting. The Court, however, left
unanswered the question of what protection a father deserves who
enjoys legal, marital status as a parent and who has not undertaken an
active parenting relationship with his child.
The Court's analysis of the rights of unwed fathers does not explain
why marriage to the child's mother makes the father's parental rights
stronger. 49 The Court focused on the substance of the relationship
between the unwed father and child, operating under an assumption
that if the relationship were legally recognized, such an analysis would
be unnecessary. It would seem rational to conclude, however, that the
state should ignore the legal connection of a married father who
leaves a family before an interpersonal relationship with the child
develops, or who allows such a relationship to lapse, when considering
placement options in order to further the best interest of the child.35
The legal connection would not outweigh the state's interest in
protecting the child and the child's need for permanency and stability.
The Court's blanket statement that the rights of legal fathers
supersede those of unwed fathers does not provide structure or
guidance for an independent analysis of the weight of the legal
relationship alone when considered as a placement option. In light of
its quality-of-relationship analysis for unwed fathers, subjecting legal
fathers to a relationship-based analysis is reasonable. The Court
rewards active parenting in the absence of a legal connection. It
should similarly reward active parenting for those with a legal
connection, and punish those with a legal connection who do not act
upon it, as legal fathers have been treated preferentially under the law
already. Legal status has granted married or divorced fathers certain
(7th ed. 1999).
345. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978).
346. Id.
347. See id.
348. Id.
349. See McCarthy, supra note 339, at 999.
350. See id.
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rights, including the right to protest an adoption. This higher standing
in comparison to unwed fathers commands subjecting legal fathers to
an equal, if not a more critical, analysis.
B. Adequate Procedure
Guidance for determining adequate procedure in child protection
and placement proceedings can be found throughout the Supreme
Court's opinions. The Court has long retreated from a formalistic,
rigid interpretation of due process procedural protections,35' repeating
that due process "'is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances."'352  Analyzing due
process in family law proceedings is complicated by combining this
need for flexibility with the inherent subjective nature of family law
decisions. Custody and placement proceedings utilize imprecise
substantive standards that require determinations based on the
subjective values of the judge.353 While seemingly applying "best
interests" or "health and safety" standards, there is no guarantee that
"a court's final conclusion ... is anything other than a reflection of the
judge's personal values. 354
Determining fair procedure poses a difficult challenge to the states
in drafting child protection legislation and to the courts in interpreting
such statutes. Due process requires fundamental fairness in the
procedures used, which involves considering relevant precedents and
assessing the interests at stake.355 For married fathers whose children
have been removed from their mothers by the state, providing strong
search and notice provisions at the outset of the child's removal from
an abusive situation is the most satisfactory solution. Once the state
has searched for and failed to find the father, or the father has failed
to voluntarily come forward, continuous notice or search attempts
thereafter are not warranted. Waiting until the situation worsens, the
child has settled into an outside placement, or the father's rights are in
danger of being terminated, brings the necessary notice too late.
When an absentee parent is not likely to be a suitable placement
351. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,572 (1972).
352. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (quoting
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895 (1961)).
353. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982) ("In appraising the nature
and quality of a complex series of encounters among the agency, the parents, and the
child, the court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh probative facts that might
favor the parent."); see also Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36 (1977) (noting
the criticism that many foster care reviews are only perfunctory because of the heavy
caseloads judges carry, and that in applying vague standards such as the best-interests-
of-the-child standard, many judges find it difficult not to rest decisions on subjective
values).
354. Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in Child, Parent, and State: Law and Policy Reader 27, 27 (S. Randall
Humm et al. eds., 1994).
355. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-25.
[Vol. 682340
LEGAL ABSENTEE FATHERS
option, which is often evident by his failure to maintain a relationship
with his child, delaying effective notice until the final stage of the
proceedings is simply too late for both father and child. The child will
have suffered the effects of delay and neglect, and the father will be
prejudiced at a later TPR proceeding for his failure to come forward
earlier. Therefore, aggressive searching and efforts to notify the
father within the early days of the child's removal are all that should
be required.
The need for comprehensive early investigation is apparent. Poor
information collection at intake can lead to surprises that slow down
the child's case disposition."6 Consequently, children languish while
social workers attempt to find fathers or identify other relatives who
could have been identified and notified earlier.3 A child may have
been placed with, and become bonded to, a foster parent when
relatives were available as a resource.3- This proves true in TPR
cases when aggressive casework "often uncovers situations in which
families can be reunified. 359
The procedures conducted prior to termination of parental rights,
however, rather than at the actual termination of those rights, are "the
true death knell for the parents."3" At the stages prior to the
termination proceeding, if the parents do not come forward and take
action, that inaction will ultimately be used against them. While
termination is the most drastic measure, the steps leading to it have
equally dramatic consequences. Therefore, "prior to the final act that
will allow the irrevocable severing of a parental relationship, a sign for
the judge to slow down and proceed with caution is needed."'- To
provide for easy solutions early on and more expeditious handling
later, the level of casework typically done at the TPR stage should
instead be performed at the beginning of the child's entry into the
system. Allowing the process to proceed without an aggressive
search, and conducting such a search only at the end of a child's
involvement in the state's custody, hurts the child and does not
adequately protect the father's rights.
In Children Can't Wait: Reducing Delays in Out-of-Home Care, z
Katharine Cahn and Paul Johnson reported the results of four
federally funded studies aimed at improving the child protection
system by reducing the delays for children ready for adoption.' 3 All
356. See Cahn & Johnson, supra note 44. at 8-9.
357. See id. at 9.
358. See id.
359. Id.
360. Linda Lee Reimer Stevenson, Fair Play or a Stacked Deck?: In Search of a
Proper Standard of Proof in Juvenile Dependency Hearings, 26 Pepp. L Rev. 613, 627
(1999).
361. Id. at 630.
362. See Cahn & Johnson, supra note 44.
363. See id at 2.
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four of the projects "emphasized better information-gathering by the
agency during the initial investigation, especially in finding out about
fathers, extended families and other natural support systems."364
These studies concluded that the time to search for the absent father
was not at the TPR stage, but during the initial stage between removal
and permanency planning. In this way, the child's time in temporary
foster care could be reduced as all resources are known early in the
process, and the information needed for termination is available and
ready to be used. According to the studies' findings, the failure to
locate a father at that stage should signal the end of the inquiry and
allow placement planning to move forward without unnecessary delay.
This approach accords with that proposed in this Note.
While it can be argued that in cities where parental surrender,
neglect, and abuse are rampant, it may seem expedient to dismiss
entirely the claims of absent parents in their children, this argument
brushes too broadly. Such a practice would deny absentee fathers any
due process whatsoever.3 65 While wholesale dismissal of inactive
parents' rights would highlight the pressing nature of the problem by
teaching these parents a "lesson," a blanket characterization of all
legal fathers as unworthy and uninterested, without providing some
notice and inquiry, reaches too far.366 This Note does not argue for
the drastic measure of providing no notice whatsoever, but for a
modified requirement that reduces the time spent searching for
fathers after the initial search has been conducted where such fathers
have had ample opportunity to assert their parental rights.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that while the "establishment of
prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication," the "Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. "367 While "[p]rocedure by presumption is always
cheaper and easier," when "the procedure forecloses the
determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly
disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly
risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent
and child."3" Addressing the rights of unwed fathers to be heard on
the state's placement of their children, the Court noted that the
incremental cost of offering unwed fathers an opportunity for
individualized hearings on fitness appears to be minimal:
364. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
365. See O'Brien, supra note 94, at 1251-52.
366. See Editorial, Children First: Bill Would Ease State's Adoption Process,
Worcester Telegram & Gazette, Mar. 1, 1999, at A6 ("For far too long our laws have
provided an excessive tilt in favor of biological parents who fail at everything but a
blood test.").
367. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
368. Id. at 656-57.
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If unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of
their children, they will not appear to demand hearings....
Extending opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and
claim competence to care for their children creates no constitutional
or procedural obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who are
not so inclined.369
Under this analysis, the Court reaches out only to those willing to
care for the child and take an active parenting role. Thus, the Court is
not seeking to protect the absent, inactive father. Indeed, as unwed
fathers can protect their notice right by registering with the state, the
effect of that registration is the opportunity to speak on the child's best
interest and nothing further.70 Similarly, notice and opportunity to
the legal father at the earliest opportunity would serve the same
purpose and effect the same rights.
In addressing the evaluation of the quality of the parental
relationship in determining rights, the Court has stated that:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents... Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do
those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When
the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. 371
Under this mandate, a state may not "arbitrarily interfere with the
parental [relationship] merely because the parent's child-raising
techniques do not fulfill the state's expectations of ideal parenting.""
Nonetheless, "[w]hile some deference to parental rights is warranted,
too much deference translates into suffering on the part of
children. '373 This suffering can come in the form of repeated abuse by
the custodial parent upon regaining custody of the child, as well as the
emotional and physical problems that develop from lingering for an
extended period in foster care. Balancing this harm to children with
an absentee parent's rights calls for increased investigative work and
notice at the early stages of the process aimed at locating and
involving a legal father in the child's placement. It does not, however,
require detailed searching and consequent delay at each and every
stage of the child's case, where the parent has failed to safeguard his
privacy interest in determining his child's living arrangement and
369. ld. at 657 n.9.
370. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 722.
371. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753-54 (1982).
372. O'Brien, supra note 94, at 1220.
373. Id. at 126-27.
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future. New York already acknowledges that timely procedure for the
termination of parental rights in appropriate cases can help reduce
unnecessary stays in foster care. 74
Ultimately, the family court judge will make the final decision on
the care, custody, and relationships in an abused or neglected child's
life.375  Most judges, who have little or no training in child
development or family pathology,376 are unaware of the impact that
delayed decision-making can have on a child's psychological
development. 37 7  To counter this adjudicatory delay, judges must
decrease the number of adjournments, particularly those that are
merely delay tactics and do not reflect real concern for the child's
welfare.3 7  This includes delays caused by attempts at finding and
notifying those fathers who have not grasped their opportunity
interest. Having been married to the mother at the time of the child's
birth, such a father has been on notice of his parental role since that
time and has lapsed in that role. Ignorance of the state's subsequent
actions in removing and placing his child outside the home is
ultimately a result of the father's choices. Waiting until an adverse
action is taken to claim that one has always cared for the interests of a
child is specious. Delaying the child's stability and development to
protect the rights of an inactive father is therefore unwarranted.
C. Application of the Mathews Factors
The Supreme Court laid out the following factors in Mathews v.
Eldridge379 for courts to balance when determining the procedures
required to protect a constitutional interest:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.8
In state placement proceedings where the father is a possible
placement option, the private interest at stake is that of a father in
raising his child. The Court has favored such an interest, at the
expense of a governmental interest, where the father has participated
374. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(1)(b) (McKinney 1992).
375. See Steinhauer, supra note 57, at 206.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 209.
378. See id. The same rationale applies to reliance on the appeal process to correct
errors. Speedy decisions improperly made leave the child in limbo as the appeal
process drags on. See id. at 211.
379. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
380. Id. at 335.
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in raising the child.381 While the Stanley Court claimed that it struck
down the Illinois statute, which denied unwed fathers any opportunity
to be heard on their child's placement after the mother's death,
because of its unconstitutional presumption language,- it did so
facing sympathetic facts.' The father in Stanley had lived with his
children and their mother for eighteen years and helped raise the
children. It is likely, based on subsequent cases, -' that were the
challenging father in Stanley long absent or irresponsible, the Court
would have upheld the statute. Therefore, the legal father's parental
interest should be mitigated by his failure to actively participate in his
child's life.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of error associated with the
available procedures.- The limited notice argued for here, to search
for and to give notice to a father early in the process, would capably
avoid error. A truly devoted father rarely will be denied the
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child, as he will
presumably have already made efforts to be part of his child's life.
Such fathers would not be denied an opportunity to be heard.
Nonetheless, court proceedings and permanency planning could go
forward more promptly and efficiently without the delay inherent in
seeking out undedicated potential claimants.
The final Mathews factor is the state's interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that would be caused by the additional or
substitute procedure.3 The Court has established the standard that
"the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by
the administrative action and to society in terms of increased
assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost." -3
Therefore, "[t]he ultimate balance involves a determination as to
when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness. ''3 ss In cases
of absent legal fathers, the costs to the parties of additional notice
381. See, eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1972) (finding that though
unmarried, the father had lived with the children and their mother until her death and
acted as the children's father for eighteen years, and was therefore entitled to be
heard on their placement).
382. See id. at 658 (striking down a presumption of unfitness rooted in
administrative convenience as violating the Due Process clause); supra notes 266-70
and accompanying text.
383. See Aizpuru, supra note 24, at 709 ("Stanley was perhaps easily decided
because a traditional family unit had existed for eighteen years and because Stanley
had custody of the children and had nurtured them throughout.... [TJhe Court did
not indicate whether unwed fathers' rights exist in every case, or whether they stem
from the existence of a traditional family unit, a long-term custodial relationship with
the children, or both.").
384. See supra Part II.B.1.
385. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976).
386. See id.
387. Id. at 348.
388. Id.
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beyond the initial search and hearing opportunities to come forward
as placement options, including financial, administrative, and
emotional burdens on the system and the children involved, do not
weigh evenly with the slim possibilities for success in placing the child
with the inactive, absent father.
Increasing the investigative work performed in the fact-finding and
case assessment stage that aims at finding all resources for the child
may ease the problem of delay without necessarily adding layers to
the procedure. Initial case assessment should involve making diligent
efforts to find all available resources. Discovering the extent of the
father-child relationship should be part of that effort. In doing so, the
agency and court avoid wasting valuable time that the child may spend
in foster care and give the non-custodial father notice at the earlier
opportunity, without waiting until the termination of parental rights
proceedings.
D. Impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
The courts have long recognized a need for strengthening and
promoting biological families. The AFSA,389 however, may weaken, if
not eliminate, that presumption with its emphasis on the child's health
and safety.3" As such, the goals of ASFA seemingly decrease the
need for providing extensive notice and opportunity to be heard to
non-custodial parents in foster care proceedings.
Each state was required to amend its laws to comply with ASFA's
funding mandates.39' In its main compliance legislation, New York
included protections to prevent the placement of a child with a foster
care or adoptive parent who has been convicted of a crime, to allow
states to refuse to unify a child with parents who have criminal
records, and advanced the opportunity to terminate parental rights for
a child who has been in foster care for fifteen of the twenty-two most
recent months.3 92 An additional, more recent piece of proposed
legislation3 93 calls for increased efforts to locate non-custodial parents
when a child is removed from his home.
While this new bill seemingly reinforces the rights of non-custodial
parents, it does not insure their protection. While non-custodial
parents are sought and considered as a resource upon the child's
removal, they are not guaranteed to be awarded custody. There is
thus no preference under the proposed statute for parental placement,
389. See supra notes 176-99.
390. ASFA "virtually repeals the requirement that states make 'reasonable efforts'
to keep families together before taking away children and putting them in foster
care." Wexler, supra note 146.
391. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
392. See An Act to Amend the Social Services Law, the Family Court Act, and the
Domestic Relations Law, ch. 7, 1999 Sess. Laws of N.Y. (Consol. 1999).
393. See supra Part I.C.2.
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merely a preference that parents are found.3 9' Therefore, the
legislation does not advance the view that non-custodial parents are
strong placement options or provide them with any elevated standing.
In effect, it seeks to do what this Note proposes-search aggressively
for parents at the beginning of the child's entry into the system to
determine their viability as a placement source, and if they prove not
to be a viable option, enable their information to be available for the
parental rights termination if that becomes necessary. If passed, the
bill likely will not lead to more placements with non-custodial parents,
as the legislation does not adequately clarify the efforts required of
child welfare agencies and thus does not enhance the rights of non-
respondent parents in these proceedings. The emphasis of the
legislation seems more on record-keeping' 95 with an eye toward TPR
proceedings,396 without truly increasing the notice and opportunity to
be heard at earlier stages of the process. Thus, the bill does not
advocate for a continual search for the absentee father that would
delay the proceedings. The legislation's objectives seem to advance
family reunification and preservation, but its language does not
command such an outcome. The addition requiring a specific search
for the non-respondent parent semantically gives those parents a new
level of protection; nonetheless, their suitability as parents must still
be evaluated. Consequently, even in this most recent New York
proposal that aims to comply with ASFA, any presumption toward
legal fathers is conspicuously absent. This position supports the
argument of this Note that legal status is not preferred status.
CONCLUSION
Parenting should be a forward-looking undertaking in which a
parent always acts in accordance with the child's best interest, not in
reaction to threatened legal action regarding the removal of his child
by the state or the termination of his parental rights. Unless extreme
preventive circumstances that prohibit a relationship between the
father and child can be proven, such as efforts made by the father that
were rebuffed by the mother, or the mother moving the children to a
location in which the father could not find them, the father should not
be given an additional opportunity to assert his parental rights after
the initial search by the state has been completed and sufficient notice
394. See. S. 5117-A Bill Memo, supra note 203 ("Efforts should be made promptly
to locate the child's noncustodial parent, if any, not simply as a potential custodial
resource, but also to ascertain any addresses that will be necessary for provision of
notice of termination of parental rights proceedings in the event that preservation of
the family unit proves not to be feasible."); supra Part I.C.2.
395. The results of the search are to be maintained in the Uniform Case Record.
See S. 5117-A, 222d Legis Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999), amending N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §
384-a(1). Such information would be used for notification at the TPR stage.
396. See S. 5117-A Bill Memo, supra note 203.
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has been provided at the earliest opportunity for him to argue his
parental fitness. This stance will compel fathers to continually
attempt to make contact with their children, or if prohibited by an
inability to locate them or other barriers, to document such legitimate
difficulties. Simply arguing that he would not have left the child had
he known the abuse by the mother would occur is an inadequate post
hoc justification.
Defining a family requires making value choices.3" The values we
choose to emphasize in family relationships have an impact on how
courts will determine the most suitable custody and care arrangement
for a child. No matter how the family is defined, it cannot successfully
operate without commitment and dedication from its members.398
Thus, the legal framework for determining custody and care should
reward committed, responsible relationships. 399 By predicating the
awarding of rights on the involvement of a parent, the law would
encourage and support fathers who act responsibly toward their
children.4" Parental rights would then flow from the fulfillment of
parental duties, as opposed to an abstract claim of right based on a
mere legal or biological relationship.40 1 A law that bases parental
rights on status alone does not adequately compel responsible
behavior.40" Consequently, the recommendations for analysis and
procedure here could apply to all parents, whether married, divorced,
or unwed.
The extreme stance of an automatic condemnation of the absentee
legal father without an inquiry into the quality of the relationship is
too harsh. At the other extreme, providing notice and opportunity to
be heard at every stage of the child placement proceedings without
accounting for the father's inaction or the impact on the child reaches
too far. Strong early notification procedures performed upon the
child's entry into the state system, the response to which can be used
to determine the required later notice, if any, strikes a proper balance.
Such a position comports with the Court's continued protection of an
associational interest, not a status interest. Additional notice
procedures for absentee parents will only delay what is essentially a
predetermined outcome.
While any rule or procedure is bound to result in occasional error,
the procedures put forth here will facilitate fair disposition of cases in
which the absentee legal father is searched for and notified. There
may always be the worst case scenarios in which a potentially good
father will be overlooked by the necessity for speed and efficiency.
397. See Harris, supra note 25, at 474.
398. See id.
399. See id.
400. See id. at 480.
401. See id.
402. See id. at 485.
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Nonetheless, the terrible scenario of children subjected to abuse and
neglect while in the care of their parents and then languishing in state
facilities, at risk of re-abuse by their foster parents, is too real to be
ignored. To sacrifice the rights and safety of these children in order to
protect the exceptional father is not warranted or necessary. This
argument is not based solely on convenience,4I3 but on the policy
justifications of ensuring children's safety and psychological
development and rewarding active parenting.
The potential practical problems of implementation of these
measures in conducting more exhaustive searches when the child first
enters into state protective services do not outweigh the effectuation
of the important interests at stake. Putting a father on notice at the
first sign of abuse and the child's removal places the burden of
response on him. A father who fails to seek custody or to take other
measures toward caring for his child once he learns that the child is in
a dangerous situation would then have less of a basis at the
termination stage on which to argue his fitness. Early notification and
the response received to it aid the judiciary in forming a more
complete family picture upon which to make a determination. It also
protects parents who truly care about the child-not those who claim
to care only when their legal rights are jeopardized. Where an
absentee father is unable to be located, assuming there are no
extenuating circumstances, he can properly be viewed as having
forfeited his right to later participation for failure to actively engage in
his child's life. While placing a child in the state system is not the
most desirable end, delaying that process to give notice and a hearing
to a father whose interest is constitutionally limited is not
procedurally required. Extraordinary efforts are not necessary to
locate these fathers and give them an opportunity to participate in
permanency planning.
The permanency command of ASFA and the speed with which
permanence is to be accomplished call for moving the level of
diligence normally delivered at the termination stage to the forefront.
Such efforts at the early stages should prevent later surprises and
errors, making the process smoother and quicker for the most
important party involved-the child.
403. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (striking down a
presumption of unfitness rooted in administrative convenience as violating the due
process clause).
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